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Functions of Freedom:
Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and
the Transnational Legal Process
FriddricG. Sourgens*
"Freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose,
Nothing don't mean nothing honey if it ain't free, now now."
Janice Joplin, Me & Bobby McGee (1971)1
ABSTRACT

What is the function of freedom for the transnationallegal
process? This Article answers this question through the lens of
the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and the deeply inconsistent
international legal arguments presented by each side of the
conflict. These inconsistencies suggest that criticism of
international law as purely political pretense has merits. The
Article shows that transnational legal process theory can
account for and incorporate these facial inconsistencies and
thus address the criticism leveled at international law. The

* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; Managing
Editor, Investment Claims Reporter (Oxford University Press).
1.
JANIS JOPLIN, Me & Bobby McGee, on Box OF PEARLS (Sony Music
Entertainment Inc. 1971). The lyrics to Bobby McGee were originally written by Kris
Kristofferson and Fred Foster. When Janice Joplin first sings the lyric, the implication
is that she is free because she loves her drifting companion, Bobby McGee. The
implication arises because in the line immediately following the definition of freedom
as having "nothing left to lose," "nothingness" itself is defined as that which is "free."
To avoid being circular, this definition plays on the connotation of "free." "Nothing" in
this sense has to be voluntarily bestowed and unconditional (i.e., freely given) but also
transient (i.e., uncompelled and uncompellable). In this sense, "nothing" is a
"something" one in fact can lose because "nothing" is transient. Such "nothing"
resembles the qualities typically associated with love. The connection is then confirmed
when the lyric returns after Bobby left our singer in the next verse. Janice Joplin now
observes with literalist sarcasm that "Freedom is just another word for nothing left to
lose,[f] Nothing, that's all that Bobby left me, yeah." Bobby McGee thus left the singer
with different kind of nothing compared to the one described earlier in the song- this
new nothingness is not "free" but paid for with chagrin. At the same time, the singer
now has that "nothing"-or chagrin, emptiness-left to lose; other than the first time
the lyric is sung, this second nothing is something one would very much want to lose
but no longer can: "But I'd trade all of my tomorrows for one single yesterday [1] To be
holding Bobby's body next to mine." Perhaps more than any other popular lyric, Bobby
McGee thus highlights the fragility of "freedom"-and its tantalizing equipoise between
being free from external constraint and freedom to pursue human fellowshipsomething that while "free" is also the most valuable thing one could possibly lose.
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Article proceeds to develop a theory of freedom as a value that is
internal to, and necessary for, transnationallegal process. This
theory of freedom relies not upon the classical liberal
understanding of freedom as positive or negative freedom.
Instead, it reconstructs freedom around the value of human
dignity. The Article concludes that freedom as dignity is a
central value of the transnational legal process and that the
transnational legal process would cease to function in its
absence.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Just like rival armies from the Middle Ages to Modernity

proclaimed that they fought for "God," rival groups in violent
uprisings today claim that they fight for "freedom." 2 For instance, in
Ukraine, pro-Western forces employ freedom to justify their ouster of
an unpopular president; 3 pro-Russian forces invoke freedom to justify
their ejection of regional and local governments unfriendly to their
cause in Crimea and throughout Eastern Ukraine. 4 Obviously, the
same God could not have supported rival sides in war.5 Perhaps just
as obviously, rival groups could not all have freedom on their side,
either.
But freedom is not just a slogan. It is a principle invoked by
states taking sides in these conflicts to legitimize the behavior of their
local champions.6 Problematically, it is invoked by the same states to
2.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPH TYERMAN, GOD'S WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
CRUSADES 27-58 (2006) (discussing the origins of Christian holy war); ROBERT
BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND CULTURAL
CHANGE 950-1350 (1993) (same); cf. Scott P. Sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of
Emergency Under International Human Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and
Politics, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 542 (2013) ("The distinction between 'terrorists' and
'freedom fighters' was contentious in the context of colonial oppression and states of
emergency and still is today in situations such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
the Kurds in Turkey, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.").
3.
See, e.g., Alan Hubbard, Inside Lines: Vitali Klitschko Set to Swap World
Title for his Freedom Fight, INDEP. (U.K.) (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.independent
.co.uk/sport/general/others/inside-lines-vitali-klitschko-set-to-swap-world-title-forhis-freedom-fight-9005530.html [http://perma.cc/JD5Y-G633] (archived Feb. 15, 2015)
(explaining that Vitali Klitschko justified his move into politics by reference to
freedom).
4.
See, e.g., Timothy
Bankcroft-Hinchey,
Crimea, Democracy and
Responsibility, PRAVDA (Russ.) (Mar. 9, 2014), http://english.pravda.rulopinion/columnists/
09-03-2014/127070-crimeademocracy-0/ [http://perma.cc/8VH5-C6AE] (archived Feb. 12,
2015) (discussing a potential breakaway of Crimea from Ukraine in terms of freedom).
5.
Cf. Wilfred Owen, The Parableof the Old Man and the Young, in POETRY
OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, AN ANTHOLOGY 171, 171-72 (Tim Kendall ed., 2013)
("Caught in a thicket by its horns, A Ram.; [1 Offer the Ram of Pride instead. [1] But
the old man would not so, but slew his son, [¶] And half the seed of Europe, one by
one."). Wilfred Owen fought in World War I and was one of the most enduring war
poets due to his depiction of the savagery of war. His particular craft was to use
classical tropes and confront them with the reality of modern war. Here, Owen uses the
claim made by all armies fighting in the World War I that they fought "for God and
Country" to show that the slaughter of the War was not so much the consequence of
God's will (as the slogan "for God and Country" would have us believe) but the result of
man's stubbornness and ignorance. For a discussion of the importance of Wilfred Owen
in the Western experience of war, see Desmond Manderson, Et Lex Perpetua: Dying
Declarations & Mozart's Requiem, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1631-36 (1999)
(discussing changes in the perception of God over the last 200 years). On Wilfred Owen,
see generally JON STALLWORTHY, WILFRED OWEN (2013).
6.
See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, InternationalLaw and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 19 (2000) (giving legal support for "[United States] policy over the last fifty
years [that] has used force and the threat of force to offset activities that the nation's
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support facially inconsistent actions. Thus, the United States and
European Union use freedom to legitimize the formation of a
government by pro-Western Ukrainian protestors following their
ejection of a Pro-Russian President. 7 At the same time, the United
States and European Union invoke freedom to condemn actions taken
by pro-Russian groups to similar ends in Crimea and Eastern
8
Ukraine as "undemocratic" and the result of "aggression." Russia
similarly relies on the concept of freedom and "independence" to
support Crimean secession from Ukraine but deems the actions of
protesters in Kyiv as inimical to freedom because they are
"unconstitutional."9
Such apparently inconsistent use of a legal concept by rival sides
in a geopolitical conflict highlights a core problem. When
sophisticated superpowers like the United States and Russia each
make arguments that on close inspection appear to defeat
themselves, international legal argument appears little more than
leaders have regarded as representing threats to the specific United States interest in
preserving fundamental freedoms"). Judge Sofaer was Legal Adviser to the United
States State Department. See id. at 11.
7.
See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Obama Casts Ukraine Crisis as March Toward
Liberty, PBS.ORG (June 4, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
obama-casts-ukraine-crisis-march-toward-liberty/ [http://perma.cc/39N5-GCGE] (archived
Feb. 19, 2015) (reporting that President Obama referred to the ouster of pro-Russian
forces as progress toward freedom); Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Senior State
Department Official, Special Briefing: Situation in Ukraine (Feb. 21, 2014), available
at http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2014/02/221917.htm [http://perma.cc/HD29-8QKU]
(archived Feb. 17, 2015) (discussing constitutional reform in Ukraine); Press Release,
Secretary of State John Kerry, Kerry Remarks (Mar, 4, 2014), available at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014103/222882.htm [http://perma.cclCQ85-4LB2] (archived
Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Kerry Statement] ("They raised their voices for dignity and
for freedom. But what they stood for so bravely, I say with full conviction, will never be
stolen by bullets or by invasions. It cannot be silenced by thugs from rooftops. It is
universal, it's unmistakable, and it's called freedom.").
8.
See, e.g., Ambassador Samantha Power, Remarks at a Security Council
Meeting on Ukraine (May 2, 2014), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/
[http://perma.cc/4E3G-HHPY]
(archived Feb. 17, 2015)
statements/225539.htm
(characterizing Russian actions as "aggression").
9.
See, e.g., Press Release, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Adoption of the Declaration of
Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (Mar. 11, 2014),
available at http://www.mid.rulbdomp/brp 4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/
4751d80fe6f93d0344257c990062a08a!OpenDocument [http://perma.ccl5MJG-A8ZZ] (archived
Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement]
(reporting the official Russian reaction to the declaration of independence by Crimea);
Press Release, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Introductory Speech by the
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and His Answers to Questions from the
Mass Media During the Press Conference Summarising the Results of Negotiations
with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry (Mar. 14, 2014), available at http://
www.mid.rulBDOMP/Brp_4.nsflarh/BO3F3C56CDAB4C1D44257C9FOO5873EE?OpenD
ocument [http://perma.cclX33X-PGPV] (archived Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Minister
Lavrov March 14, 2014 Statement] (noting that protesters through armed provocation
violated the terms of a February 21, 2014 agreement between the government and the
protesters).
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pretense. 1 Such exchanges make it look as if international law
lacked a means to sort sense from nonsense-acceptable argument
from preposterous proposition.' 1 Critics of international law have
long seized upon this perplexing quality of international legal
argument.1 2 They submit with some apparent force that international
law simply cannot be used as a measure for assessing international
behavior; international law is normatively bankrupt.' 3
As discussed in Part II, transnational legal process scholarship
provides a means to refute this skepticism. 1 It shows that

10.
See David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 1, 20 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, Sources] (dividing international law into
"hard" and "soft" arguments; "[a] 'hard' argument will seek to ground compliance in the
'consent' of the state to be bound. A 'soft' argument relies upon some extraconsensual
notion of the good or the just" and submitting that all international legal positions
relies upon both hard and soft arguments); see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, BETWEEN
APOLOGY AND UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 59 (2005)

[hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA] (defining international law as being made up of
descending and ascending arguments, descending being "premised on the assumption
that a normative code overrides individual State behavior, will or interest" and
ascending being "premised on the assumption that State behavior, will and interest are
determining of the law").
11.
International legal discourse would thus strongly resemble many a
conversation in Alice in Wonderland. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND 53 (Branden Books 1948) ('"Who are you? Said the Caterpillar. This was
not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, 'I - I hardly
know, Sir, just at present - at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I
think I must have been changed several times since then.' 'What do you mean by that'
said the Caterpillar, sternly. 'Explain yourselfl' 'I can't explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir,'
said Alice, 'because I'm not myself, you see.' 'I don't see,' said the Caterpillar. 'I'm
afraid I can't put it more clearly,' Alice replied, very politely, 'for I can't understand it
myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes is a very confusing thing.' 'It
isn't,' said the Caterpillar. 'Well, perhaps you haven't found it so yet,' said Alice; 'but
when you have to turn into chrysalis - you will some day, you know - and then after
that into a butterfly, I should think you'll feel it a little queer, won't you?' 'Not a bit,'
said the Caterpillar. 'Well, perhaps your feelings may be different,' said Alice: 'all I
know is, it would feel very queer to me. 'You!' said the Caterpillar contemptuously.
'Who are you?' Which brought them back to the beginning of the conversation.")
(emphasis in original). See also KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67.
12.
See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67, 269; see also David
Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 471, 473 (2007); Martti
Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Post-Modern
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553, 561-62 (2002) (arguing that tribunals constituted
under different treaty instruments "are engaged in a hegemonic struggle in which each
hopes to have its special interests identified with the general interest" (emphasis
omitted)); Paul B. Stephan, PrivatizingInternationalLaw, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1611
(2011) ("The variety of these tribunals and a lack of hierarchy among them in turn
allow the cherry-picking on which progressive development of legal doctrine depends.").
13.
See supra note 12.
14.
See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,
184 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, TLP; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Obey]; see
also Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 85-90 (2013)
(presenting an alternative theory based explanations for cooperation amongst states
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international law is not a formalist system, as the critique would

tacitly suppose, but rather a synthetic meaning-generating process
anchored in the norms and values of its participants.15 As the wealth
of transnational legal process scholarship explains, this synthetic
process does not prefer any problem solutions because of their greater
purity measured by reference to an outside axiom, or policy
preference.1 6 Instead, this web of problem solutions reflects the entire
normative world inhabited by its participants. But this web remains a
"legal" rather than a policy process because the web organizes this
material in an inherently autonomous manner on the basis of the
inductive strength of a proposed problem solution to the web of past
legal problem solutions.' 7 The apparent contradictions identified by a
Koskenniemian critique thus do not speak to the futility of
international law but are testament to its richness and vitality.' 8
Through the lens of transnational legal process, there is thus no
facial contradiction in the positions taken by the United States and
Russia with regard to the Ukrainian crisis.1 9 Instead, the United
States and Russia argue about which past problem solution the
current situation most resembles. 2 0 In other words, both appeal to our
store of cumulative historical experience rather than a purely
scientific or metaphysical principle.
But Part II also concludes with a puzzling question: when
current events force us to analyze the use of rivaling conceptions of
freedom in international legal argument we have to ask does
transnational legal process engage merely in strategies of evasion? 21
The fulcrum of the international legal critique is that international
law is normatively meaningless because it lacks a value of its own. 22
In fact, transnational legal process theorists such as Harold Hongju
Koh appear to concede as much when they reject theories that on
their face import a single value or policy preference into the legal
during the treaty formation process); Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Does Humanity-Law
Require (or Imply) a Progressive Theory of History? (And Other Questions for Martti
Koskenniemi), 27 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 377, 370-83 (2013) (refuting critics'
mischaracterizations of Kant); Gregory Shaffer, TransnationalLegal Processand State
Change, 37 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 229, 232-36, 248-58 (2012) [hereinafter Shaffer,
Process];Frbd6ric G. Sourgens, Reconstructing InternationalLaw as Common Law, 42
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with the author).
15.
See Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2646.
16.
See id.
17.
See id.
18.
See id. at 2627 (noting the "richness" of transnational legal process); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1409 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, How] (transnational legal process leads to "a
much richer picture" of international law).
19.
See infra Part II.D.
20.
See infra Part II.D.
21.
See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 342.
22.
See id. at 67 ("[I]nternational law is singularly useless as a means for
justifying or criticizing international behavior." (footnote omitted)).
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process. 23 Critics therefore appear free to argue that this renders
transnational process arguments entirely dependent upon politics.2 4
The current Ukrainian crisis painfully appears to illustrate their
point: one's conception of freedom even as international lawyers
appears to depend not upon our legal convictions but upon the side
from which we perceive the conflict. International law then does in
fact appear to be "singularly useless as a means for justifying or
criticizing international behavior" in Ukraine.2 5
The Ukrainian crisis, and others like it, thus illustrates both the
difficulty and the importance of the task ahead. To defend
transnational legal process theory, one has to identify the value of the
transnational legal process-what are scholars engaged in
transnational legal process theory actually for?26 Failing to answer
that question makes transnational legal process theory little more
than dress up for the foreign policy positions espoused by their
respective governments. 27 As this was one of the problems the
transnational legal process project sought to resolve, answering this
question is of particular importance for the growing number of adepts
of this school of thought.28
Given the international nature of crises like Ukraine, the first
question is whether freedom applies only to states, or whether it
reaches peoples or individuals. Part III begins its analysis by
addressing this question. It notes that the United States and Russia
each argue on the basis of fundamentally inconsistent subjects of
freedom. At times, each argues that Ukraine (as a state) is free to
discredit the actions of political dissidents.29 At times, each argues

23.
See, e.g., Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2623 ("The New Haven School
merged law into policy, and by so doing, too readily concluded that what constitutes
right policy is per se lawful." (emphasis added)).
24.
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, in THE
POLITICS OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2011) [hereinafter
Koskenniemi, Politics]; Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of InternationalLaw. Twenty
Years Later, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63, 65 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.,
2011).
25.
See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67.
Cf. id.
26.
27.
See Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the "New" Schools: Assessing the
Legitimacy of InternationalLegal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L
L. 455, 462-67 (2007) [hereinafter Waters, Normativity] (summarizing the legitimacy
problems of transnational legal process scholarship).
28.
See Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of
InternationalLaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1991, 2006 (1995) (noting that the New Haven school
is plagued with problems because its value goal "in practical application has meant
defending the contested international initiatives of the [United States] government"
(footnote omitted)); Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2622-24 (demonstrating the need to
get away from potentially apologist process theories).
29.
See, e.g., Ambassador Samantha Power, Remarks to the United Nations
Security Council (Mar. 19, 2014), availableat http://usun.state.govfbriefing/statements/
223716.htm [http://perma.cclE6XS-7JH3] (archived Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Ambassador
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that individuals are free in order to discredit the actions of the
central government.30 And at times, each argues that ethnic groups
or peoples have a right to self-determination to trump the rights of
both Ukraine and individuals living in Ukraine.3 1
As Part III explains, the transnational legal process accepts each
of these facially inconsistent arguments as valid legal propositions. 32
This on its face means that the transnational legal process either
completely lacks a concept of freedom-and accepts historically based
arguments about freedom from any theory of historical importance for
the development of international law-or that the transnational legal
process can still overcome these deep inconsistencies.3 3
Part III provides a basis for reconciliation. Transnational legal
process accepts that each of these arguments are relevant but does so
through the lens of personal freedom. 34 Transnational legal process
reconciles these competing positions because it views persons not as
atomistic individuals but instead as citizens and members of a wide
variety of communities. as Transnational legal process accepts
arguments about the freedom of the state (i.e., Ukraine) and the
freedom of peoples (e.g., ethnic Russians and ethnic Tatars) because
they, too, reflect personal liberty. 36 A person living in a state that is
occupied or otherwise coerced by its neighbor or is part of an
oppressed ethnic minority sensibly should claim that he or she lacks
freedom. In other words, the transnational legal process submits that

Power March 19, 2014 Statement] (arguing that Russia's actions against Crimea
undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine); Provocations, EU's FinancialInterests
Behind Ukraine Protests - Lavrov, RT (Dec. 14, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://rt.com/
news/lavrov-ukraine-criticism-provocations-243/ [http://perma.cc/6F9B-DZBF] (archived
Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter RT December 14, 2013 Article] ("[Russian Foreign Minister]
Lavrov defended the Ukrainian government's right to take decisions on its national
policy and criticized Western officials who have sided with the protesters demanding
the government's resignation.").
30.
See Kerry Statement, supra note 7 (quoted above); Kiev Authorities No
Longer Concerned with Lives of Civilians, Military and Militias, ITAR-TASS (Aug. 4,
2014, 10:25 PM), http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/743510 [http://perma.cc/B4UG-5F29]
(archived Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter ITAR-TASS August 4, 2014 Wire Story] (quoting
the Russian Foreign Ministry as follows: "The Kiev authorities instigated by their
western sponsors are carrying out a punitive operation killing and wounding civilians
and destroying civilian infrastructure. A humanitarian situation in the region is
getting worse.").
31.
See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra note 9
(defending Crimean independence on grounds of the right to self-determination);
Ambassador Power March 19, 2014 Statement, supra note 29 (raising discrimination
and political violence against Tatars as an argument against effectiveness of the
Crimean independence vote).
32.
See infra Part III.D.
33.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.D.
34.
35.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.D.
36.
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there is tension because each person feels a similar tension or conflict
when "Freedom," capital "F," is threatened.3 7
Part IV turns to the question of what this new-found personal
freedom means. Traditionally, conceptions of freedom in political
theory are defined as "positive" freedom (freedom to) 38 and "negative"
conceptions of freedom (freedom from).39 Part IV showcases how the
United States and Russia in their arguments about the Ukrainian
crisis indiscriminately use arguments from the two principal rival
conceptions of freedom recognized by modern political theorynegative freedom (freedom from), and positive freedom (freedom to).
Again, it appears that the transnational legal process is at an
impasse-it seeks to incorporate two normative values that are
ultimately logically incommensurable.
Part IV submits that a process theory can embrace such
incommensurability without giving up a substantive conception of
freedom. It explains that the transnational legal process incorporates
both views of freedom-negative and positive-through the lens of
human dignity. Human dignity reflects both the right of the person to
be respected by others and the need to cooperate with others as a
process participant. 40 The Article reconstitutes this lens of human
dignity by incorporating humanist thought reintroduced to
contemporary political theory by historians such as J.G.A. Pocock and
classical philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum. 4 1
The Article contributes to the growing transnational legal
process literature by providing the first inquiry into what its core
value, its conception of freedom, is. The Article concludes that
transnational legal process has such a value-and that this value,
human dignity, has further significance. The Article's focus upon
human dignity ultimately rejoins transnational legal process
scholarship with Myres McDougal's, Harold Lasswell's, and W.
Michael Reisman's "old" process school. 42 Both transnational legal

37.
38.
39.
40.

See
See
See
See

infra Part III.D.
infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.A.
infra Part IV.C.

41.
See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION passim (2003); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND
PHILOSOPHY passim (2d ed., 2001) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FOG]; MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS, WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE passirn (2013)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, PE].

42.
See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, The Dorsey Comment: A Modest
Retrogression, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 54 (1988) (noting the centrality of human dignity);
W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New Haven School:
A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 575, 575-76 (2007) ("The New Haven School
was developed by Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell. McDougal
had been trained in classics and later at Oxford in legal history. Lasswell, at the time
that he met McDougal, was already recognized as one of the most creative political and
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process and the old school ultimately defend the value of human
dignity. But whereas the old school seeks to do so through external
justification, transnational legal process ultimately can provide an
internal justification for human dignity. 43 This switch in perspective
further cements the value of human dignity to transnational law as
its quintessential precondition-and thus permits the rather startling
proposition that without human dignity transnational law simply
ceases to exist.44 It is thus the absence of transnational law that leads
to the dystopian vision of pure politics painted by the critiques of
international law-not transnational law.
This Article concludes that this new appraisal of the functions of
freedom in the transnational legal process provides a measure by
which to judge which party may legitimately label itself a champion
of freedom. In the Ukrainian context, this analysis reveals that while
there are no angels in foreign policy, the U.S. claim to protect freedom
is by and large stronger than that of its Russian counterpart. The
U.S. claim takes (more) seriously the right of those most affected by
geopolitical decisions to participate in their making. 45 It is, in this
case at least, by and large less cynical and destructive of the
transnational legal process than the exercise of empire by military
and paramilitary force.

II. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM: MIGHT, RIGHT, OR PROCESS
The Ukrainian crisis shows the limitations of axiomatic theories
of freedom in international law.46 The arguments advanced by both
the United States and Russia rely on arguments drawn from
inconsistent Realpolitik and idealist axioms in order to make sense of
the ongoing crisis. 4 7 In fact, it is not currently feasible to create an
account that draws on a single axiom to resolve the problem-the
theoretical
premises
of
Realpolitik
and
idealism
are
incommensurable. 4 8
social scientists of the twentieth century. The jurisprudential school that they created
at Yale adapts the analytical methods of the social sciences to the prescriptive purposes
of the law. Deploying multiple methods, it seeks to develop tools to bring about changes
in public and civic order that will make them more closely approximate the goals of
human dignity which it postulates." (footnotes omitted)).
43.
See id. (noting the empirical basis for the value commitment to human
dignity in social scientific and comparative law research).
44.
A similar switch of perspective permitted Plato in the Protagorasto anchor
a unitary vision of ethical goodness. See NUsSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 119-21.
45.
See infra Part V.
46.
See infra Parts II.B & II.C.
47.
See infra Part II.A.

48.

See infra Part II.C. On the concept of incommensurability, see Cass R.

Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994)
("Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single
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The state of legal arguments about Crimea's annexation by the
Russian Federation following the ouster of a pro-Russian Ukrainian
president by popular protests in Western Ukraine thus presents
fertile grounds for the critics of international law.4 9 Relying on Marti
Koskenniemi's critique of international law, they submit that
international law is at best powerless in resolving, and at worst
complicit in creating, the current crisis.50 The basis for this critique is
the inability of international law to form a single common normative
denominator. 5 ' Instead, all actions can be legally defended, and all
actions can be legally impeached.52
The obvious retort to these critics is that truth lies not in a
unique common denominator but in a balance of competing
principles. 53 Instead of making all arguments measurable on a single
scale, this balance assumes that law as process reflects the
incommensurable values of its participants. 54 Process, in other words,
must permit the striking of a balance without providing a linear
scale.5 5
As this Part will conclude, process theory makes such balancing
of incommensurable values possible. It creates an inductive structure
which can compare whether, to paraphrase Justice Scalia, a line is
longer than a rock is heavy.56
While process theory can compute an outcome in such scenarios,
and thus compute whether the legal arguments advanced by the
United States are more plausible than the legal arguments advanced
by Russia, it raises the question whether it can only do so because it
is ultimately agnostic about value. This Part will thus leave us to
answer a deeper question: does the transnational legal process of
decision making simply determine a "winner" in the legal contest
metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are
best characterized.").
49.
See, e.g., Solomon Appiah, Competing Interests: the Ukranian Crisis,
OPEDNEWS.COM (Mar. 14, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/CompetingInterests-The-U-by-Solomon-Appiah-CrisisDiplomatsGovemmentKremlin-140314-961.html
[http://perma.cclHY23-GP9A] (archived Feb. 18, 2015) (analyzing the Ukrainian crisis
through a Koskenniemian lens).
50.
See id. (citing MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS:
THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2002)).

51.
See Koskenniemi, Politics, supra note 24 passim.
52.
See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67 (noting that international
law can be used to legitimize or attack any action).
53.
See infra Part II.D.
54.
See infra Part II.D.
55.
See infra Part II.D.
56.
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J. concurring). Justice Scalia's comment is directed at the lack of
common unit for balancing. Instead, balancing tests such as the one at issue in Bendix
Autolite Corp. compare interests that are ultimately incommensurate. On
incommensurability in the U.S. law context, see Frdd6ric Gilles Sourgens, Reason and
Reasonableness, The Necessary Diversity of the Common Law, 64 ME. L. REV.
(forthcoming January 2015) (on file with the author).
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between Great Powers or does it tell us something about freedom in a
truly pluralist world order?
A. When Realpolitik Meets Idealism - The Ukrainian Crisis
At first blush, it appears that the arguments regarding the
Ukrainian crisis advanced by the United States rely upon an
idealistic conception of freedom and that the arguments advanced by
Russia rely upon a notion of freedom drawn from Realpolitik.
According to this intuitive narrative, the United States supported
Ukrainian protesters from late 2013 to enforce human rights norms
and defend the freedom of the Ukrainian people against allegedly
unconstitutional acts of their government.5 7 Similarly, when Russian
forces invaded Crimea and Crimea held a referendum to secede from
Ukraine, the United States stood vocally in the way of Realpolitik,
that is, Russia's attempt to create new conditions on the ground by
forcibly taking control of Crimea and, as it then appeared, Eastern
Ukraine more generally. 58
Russia, on the other hand, at first blush looks like the cynical
champion of Realpolitik. During the protests of pro-Western
demonstrators, Russia emphasized the right of Ukraine's then proRussian government to deal with its internal affairs free from
Western interference. 5 Similarly, the arguments supporting the
Russian annexation of Crimea were premised in effectiveness-a vote
in favor of the annexation having occurred, albeit in the presence of
Russian special forces walking the streets.6 0

57.
See, e.g., Testimony of Thomas 0. Melia, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, Statement Submitted for the Record to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/
r1s/rm/20141219827.htm [http://perma.cc/T6F2-LSGH] (archived Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter
State Department January 15, 2014 Testimony] ("[T]he [United States] stands with the
Ukrainian people in solidarity in their struggle for fundamental human rights and a
more accountable government."); Nico Kirsch, Crimea and the Limits of International
Law, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-limits-ofinternational-law/ [http://perma.cc/67YC-FHJU] (archived Feb. 14, 2015) ("At the same
time, there are aspects of the Crimea crisis that do seem to reflect a certain impact of
international law. Cynically enough, the strongest effect might be that we see Russia
intervening 'only' in Crimea - not in Eastern Ukraine or Ukraine as a whole (for
now).").

58.
See, e.g., Ambassador Powers March 19, 2014 Statement, supra note 29
("The United States rejects Russia's military intervention and land grab in Crimea.
These actions, again, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine .... ).
59 RT December 14, 2013 Article, supra note 29 ("[Russian Foreign Minister] Lavrov
defended the Ukrainian government's right to take decisions on its national policy and
criticized Western officials who have sided with the protesters demanding the
government's resignation.").
60.
See, e.g., Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra
note 9 (quoted above); Minister Lavrov March 14, 2014 Statement, supra note 8 (quoted
above).
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This narrative, while convenient, is imprecise. Careful analysis
of the statements of the United States and Russia shows that the
United States and Russia each rely on arguments grounded in
Realpolitik and arguments grounded in an idealistic view of
international law. 61 The arguments advanced by each the United
States and Russia thus appear to be mired in self-contradiction: they
defend effectiveness when their respective side holds the upper hand
and human rights when it does not, without acknowledging the
fundamental problem such inconsistency creates.
For instance, the United States relied heavily upon Realpolitk
following the ouster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych in late
February 2014.62 Almost immediately, the United States supported
the newly formed government on grounds of effectiveness-President
Yanukovych fled the country. 63 Success in overthrowing the prior
government at its simplest level was the mark of its legitimacy.6 4 The
United States position in this instance had to rely upon effectiveness.
Just prior to the ouster of President Yanukovych, the United States
and the European Union on the side of the protesters and Russia on
the side of President Yanukovych had negotiated a constitutional
solution to end the internal standoff.65 This negotiated solution

foresaw that President Yanukovych would remain in power.6 6 The
ouster of President Yanukovych within days of reaching this
agreement thus deviates from the theme of constitutional, rule-of-law
based reform previously endorsed by the United States. 67

61.
Compare supranotes 59-60 and accompanying text, with supra note 58 and
infra notes 63-64 & 67 and accompanying text.
62.
See Conal Urquhart & Barry Neild, Ukraine: Tymoshenko Freed as
PresidentDenounces "Coup"- 22 February As It Happened, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Feb. 22,
2014, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/22/ukraine-crisis-uncertaintyafter-yanukovych-signs-deal-live-updates [http://perma.cc/8NCW-MEB8] (archived Feb.
17, 2015).
63.
See Ambassador Samantha Power, Remarks at a UN Security Council
Meeting on Ukraine (Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/
statements/222805.htm [http://perma.cc/8NCW-MEB8] (archived Feb. 17, 2015)
("Indeed, he fled the city; he packed up himself and his family, and he left the seat of
the presidency vacant for two days while his country was in crisis.").
64.
See id.
65.
See Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine, GUARDIAN (U.K.)
(Feb. 21, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreementon-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text_[http://perma.ccl3HHA-T2N5] (archived
Feb. 17, 2015).
66.
See id.
67.
The U.S. State Department in fact relies only on the act of fleeing itself as
justification for disregarding the terms of the February 21 agreement thus giving into
effectiveness completely. See Press Release, United States State Dep't, President
Putin's Fiction: 10 False Claims About Ukraine (Mar. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm [http://perma.cclP22T-AWC7] (archived
Feb. 17, 2015).
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Similarly, and understandably given the facts, the Russian
position relied upon idealist arguments. The very justification for
Russian involvement is principally a defense of constitutional
government in Ukraine. 68 Russia submitted both that it intervened at
the behest of the constitutionally elected government of Ukraine and
that it acted to protect ethnic Russian populations against possible
excesses against that population by a rogue government.69 Both of
these arguments echo internationalist legal arguments developed
precisely to combat Realpolitik. 70 The Russian position in this
instance had to rely upon internationalist arguments. A theme
constantly struck by Russia is that the West inappropriately involved
itself in Ukrainian internal affairs.7 1 Russia therefore could not rely
upon effectiveness in order to support its own intervention without
conceding the right of the United States and the European Union to
do the same. The intervention permitting the arguments on the basis
of effectiveness thus needed an internationalist justification in its
own right. 72
A nuanced appraisal of the United States and Russian positions
shows that each relies upon facially inconsistent arguments. Both
assert that the effectiveness of measures favoring their interests
legitimize these measures.73 But both also assert that legitimacy does
not depend upon effectiveness but upon rights-based norms. 74
Problematically, these rights-based arguments significantly undercut
critical portions of their respective initial positions. Taking the rightsbased argument seriously, the United States position regarding the
removal of President Yanukovych and the prosecution of Ukraine's
fight to regain control of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea are deeply

68.
Michael B. Kelley, Putin: What Happened in Kiev Was an Unconstitutional
Overthrow and Yanukovych Is Still President, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2014, 5:54 AM)
[hereinafter Putin March 4, 2014 Interview], http://www.businessinsider.com/putin-whathappened-in-kiev-was-an-unconstitutional-overthrow-and-yanukovych-is-still-president-20143 [http://perma.cc/U2L7-HYCB] (archived Feb. 19, 2015) (quoting President Putin as
claiming that the protesters' ouster of Yanukovych violated a truce signed on February
21, 2014).
69.
Ukraine's Yanukovych Asked for Troops, Russia Tells UN, BBC.coM (U.K.)
(Mar. 4, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-europe-26427848
[http://
perma.cc/F9LZ-V4SG] (archived Feb. 19, 2015) ("Ousted Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych asked Russia to send troops across the border to protect civilians . . . .");
see also Kathy Lally & Will Englund, Putin Says He Reserves Right to Protect Russians
in Ukraine, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves
-the-right-to-use-force-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a389-11e3-a5fa-55foc77bf39c~story.html
[httpJ/perma.cclEYL7-SBJ6] (archived Jan. 20, 2015).
See infra Part III. C.
70.
71.
See RT December 14, 2013 Article, supra note 29 (quoted above).
72.
The same pattern of international legal argument is in fact typical of all
international legal disputes. See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67.
73.
See supra notes 57-60, 63-64, 67 and accompanying text.
74.
See supra notes 57-60, 63-64, 67 and accompanying text.
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suspect; Russia appears correct that the overthrow was
unconstitutional, potentially in violation of a negotiated truce, and
that the Ukrainian strategy in both Eastern Ukraine and Crimea
disproportionately,
and thus illegally, targets the civilian
population.75 But taking rights-based arguments seriously, Russia
does not have a leg to stand on, either. The declaration of
independence of Crimea and its annexation by Russia, along with the
support of uncontrollable militia wreaking havoc in Eastern Ukraine
to the point of apparently shooting down a civilian airliner "by
mistake," do not live up to the rights-based arguments espoused by
Russia. 76
The Ukrainian crisis thus appears to fit the mold of the
Koskenniemian critique of international law. The critique submits
that all international legal argument relies upon combining
fundamentally inconsistent propositions, some based purely upon
effectiveness, state will, and state power, others based upon a
conception that effectiveness, state will, and state power must obey
external norms to be legal and legitimate.77 The Ukrainian crisis thus
appears to be one more recent example of the critique's claim that
international law is fundamentally meaningless in assessing and
resolving international disputes.7 8 How all parties involved to date
have behaved themselves in the crisis would tend to lend intuitive
credibility to that claim.
B. Might - InternationalLaw as Realpolitik

"I will make it legal."7 9 This claim by a fictional upstart Senator
dealing with an international crisis describes a common conception of
international law.80 What is "law" is what people get away with.81 To

75.
See, e.g., Putin March 4, 2014 Interview, supra note 68 (quoting President
Putin as accusing the West of supporting an unconstitutional coup in violation of a
written truce agreement); ITAR-TASS August 4, 2014 Wire Story, supra note 30
(quoting the Russian Foreign Ministry as accusing the "Kiev authorities instigated by
their western sponsors" to carry out operations disproportionately affecting the civilian
population).
76.
See Helen Davidson, MH17: Rebels Likely Shot Down Plane "By Mistake,"
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 23, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/
23/mh17-rebels-likely-shot-down-plane-by-mistake-live-updates [http://perma.cclL9C98NAX] (archived Feb. 14, 2015).
77.
See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67; Kennedy, Sources, supra
note 10, at 20.
78.

See KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67.

79.
aletterofmarque, Star Wars Episode 1 - "Iwill Make it Legal", YOUTUBE
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nz20lu2AM2k [https://perma.cc/9TZT
-NUYM?type=source] (archived Mar. 5, 2015).
80.
Id.; see also Pedro Talavera, Peace as Priority, 13 IUS GENTIUM 205, 224
(2012) (noting the relationship between neo-conservative U.S. legal scholarship, Carl
Schmitt, and Realpolitik).
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determine what is law is simply to follow Realpolitik, power, or
might.
Contrary to what one might believe, this view of Realpolitik has
a cogent legal and theoretical view of, and place for, freedom.
Following the temptation to treat Realpolitik as simply the opposite
of lawfulness would thus be incorrect. It, in turn, would be simplistic
to deem all parties in the Ukrainian crisis to be in violation of their
international obligations whenever they fail to observe a relevant
rights-based norm. This conclusion would fail to reflect the current
state of international law.
Doctrinally, legal conceptions of Realpolitik can rely upon the
doctrine of "effective control." 82 According to this doctrine, "a
government in effective control of the territory is generally accepted
as the representative of the population within that territory even if it
has assumed power through violent or otherwise undemocratic
methods."8 3 The implications of power politics are unmistakable:
The international order's attribution of sovereign independence to
established territorial political communities thereby has traditionally
entailed (to put it most bluntly) the right of each to fight its civil war in
peace and to be ruled by its own thugs. Insofar as it is perceived as
little more than an imprimatur for 'might makes right' at the local
level, this 'effective control doctrine' is manifestly offensive to a rule of
84
law sensibility.

Such doctrinal precepts rely upon a theoretically cogent view of
freedom. 8 5 The Realpolitik view of freedom was developed by the
early leading "realist," Thomas Hobbes. 86 To Hobbes, freedom was a
matter of the assertion of will. 8 7 Such assertion of will was not "free"

in the sense of being a matter of free choice; the will was
mechanically determined. 88 The assertion of will therefore was little
81.
Cf. Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 108 (2001) ("[T]here are always wills of states to be found at the
origin of customary rules . . . .").
82.

Cf.

JAMES CRAWFORD,

THE

CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 55-61 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the importance of effective governmental control
in the context of the status of statehood in international law).
LINDBLOM,
83.
ANNA-KARIN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2005).

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANISATIONS

IN

84.
Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law:
Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine, 11 MELB. J. INT'L L. 393, 394
(2010).
85.
But see Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 138 (2009) ("[T]he realist model seems to leave little
room for the consideration of individual liberties .... ).
86.
See Mary Robinson, Fifth Annual Grotius Lecture, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 1, 1 (2003) (noting the existence of "a more realistic-perhaps the better term is
'realpolitik'-tradition that draws on the writings of the English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes").
87.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 148 (A. R. Waller ed., 1904) (1651)
[hereinafter LEVIATHAN].

88.

See id.
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more than the effectuation of externally conditioned impulses. 8
These impulses are broadly reducible to the avoidance of aversion and
the satisfaction of appetites.90 Freedom was simply the absence of
external physical constraint. 9 ' Freedom did not describe the absence
of interference with internal impulses.9 2 To Hobbes, such a conception
would have been absurd as all internal impulses were by definition
equally mechanistically predetermined by the outside world.93 To the
extent a person makes a choice, asserts his or her will, it is thus a
given that outside circumstances predetermined the decision. 94
Freedom describes the absence of physical incarceration-and little
else.95

Applying Hobbes to international Realpolitik, we thus arrive at
the principle of effectiveness. In true Hobbesian fashion, it does not
matter whether there is any outside pressure brought to bear on civil
society in order to inform which "thug" would rule. 96 The only
question, through the prism of Hobbesian freedom, is one of least
aversion: which thug is most likely to provide relative security, which
thug is more like the storm likely to destroy the ship of state.9 7 A
decision to submit to a thug who promises such relative security-no
matter on what material basis-thus would be perfectly free.98
C. Right - InternationalLaw as Command
The philosophical origin of rights-based arguments raised by all
sides in the Ukrainian crisis confirms our intuitive conclusion: rightsbased arguments are diametrically opposed to Realpolitik.9 9 Tracing
the genealogy of rights-based international legal arguments leads us

89.
For a list of relevant impulses, see id. at 28-38.
See id.
90.
91.
D. D. RAPHAEL, HOBBES: MORALS AND POLITICS 27 (1977) (explaining that
for Hobbes, "freedom is to be contrasted with external compulsion" and that response to
fear of an "unpleasant experience" is "internal ... a form of aversion . .. and voluntary
or free").
92.
See id.
93.
See Thomas Pink, Freedom and Action Without Causation: Noncausal
Theories of Freedom and Purposive Agency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE
WILL 349, 353 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011) (noting that to Hobbes, the will was
always externally predetermined).
See id.
94.
95.

See LEVIATHAN, supra note 87, at 148; QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND

REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 135-37 (2008) [hereinafter SKINNER, HOBBES] (discussing the
development of Hobbes' thought to its final destination to equate what is voluntary
with what is free by reference to the example of sea wreck).
See RAPHAEL, supra note 91, at 27.
96.
97.
See LEVIATHAN, supra note 87, at 118-19.
98.
See SKINNER, HOBBES, supra note 95, at 138 ("Although [a person] brings
his freedom to an end, he does so by way of acting freely.").
See supra Part II.A.
99.

488

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 48:471

to a radically different view of freedom. This view of freedom takes
choice seriously in the sense that it is premised in safeguarding
choice, the right to choose, against political and social compulsion. 0 0
Such a view is irreconcilably different from the Hobbesian account of
freedom.101 All attempts to find a common denominator between
rights-based and effectiveness-based norms in international law
made relevant by the facially inconsistent arguments used in the
Ukrainian conflict are thus destined to fail. Consequently, the critics
of international law appear to be making a dangerously valid
observation when they submit that international legal argument in
the context of the Ukrainian crisis and beyond is ultimately selfdefeating and absurd.1 02
Doctrinally, rights-based academics submit that as a matter of
international law the unconstitutional overthrow of government is
ultimately illegitimate. 103 The government that emerges from it
cannot rightfully be recognized.1 0 4 Nor can many of its actions.1 051n
order to be legitimate, according to these arguments, control must be
more than effective.1 06 It must satisfy certain external criteria. 107
These criteria are ultimately normative-they set out what states

100.
See SAMUEL FREEMAN JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON
RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35-36 (2007) (discussing the importance and
problem of choice in social contract theory).
101.
See Pink, supra note 93, at 353 (noting the impossibility of "choice" in the
traditional sense in Hobbesian theory).
See KOKSENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67 (quoted above).
102.

See, e.g., Jean d'Aspremont, The International Law of Statehood:
103.
Craftsmanship for the Elucidation and Regulation of Births and Deaths in
International Society, 29 CONN. J. INT'L L. 201, 218 (2014) (summarizing the
submissions of legalist theorists); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based

HumanitarianIntervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 499, 545 (2013) (explaining that "states have ... continued to treat
a government overthrown by an unconstitutional process . . . as the recognized
government of a state" despite its lack of effective control (citing Jean d'Aspremont,

Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 877,
901-02 (2006)); Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and
Coups d'Etat, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 138 (2011); Roth, supra note 84, at 42730, 435-39; see also, e.g., Roth, supra note 84, at 395 (summarizing this position but
noting that Realpolitik is not so easily jettisoned).
104.
See, e.g., Jeremy I. Levitt, Pro-DemocraticIntervention in Africa, 24 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 785, 793 (2006) ("[D]emocratic governance appears to have attained a more
prominent status than the effective control doctrine." (footnote omitted)).

105.

See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger, The Recognition of Governments Under

InternationalLaw: The Challenge of the BelarusianPresidentialElection of September
9, 2001 for the United States, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107, 129 (2003) (noting that
in the context of the non-recognition of a government (rather than a state) "[t]he impact
of non-recognition is generally limited to denying an unrecognized government access
to [United States] courts and ignoring its ownership of property belonging to the state
that the government purports to represent" (footnote omitted)).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
106.
107.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text,
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ought to do, how they ought to act rather than how they habitually do
act. 108 These normative commands counterbalance and contain
Realpolitik.109
Just as the Realpolitik position is indebted to Hobbes, the
normative internationalist position is indebted to John Locke.11 0
Locke's theoretical project was to counter Realpolitik."ti To Locke,
freedom requires not only an application of will as it did for
Hobbes.11 2 Rather, it requires that any choice to be free must be made
without outside compulsion." 3 The choice is free only to the extent
that it is not driven by physical coercion or fear of physical
coercion. 114
This conception of freedom led directly to the Lockean social
contract. The social contract had to be entered into freely."i 5 This
freedom required that the subjects of the state delegated authority
(and the limits of authority) to the State rather than the subjects
simply submit to the arbitrary power of the state outright.116
This move by Locke directly contradicted Hobbesian Realpolitik.
One Locke scholar summarizes the root of this disagreement as
follows:

108.

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

109.

See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 103, at 546 (noting a practice by many

states "to continue to recognize the ousted government have also been willing to take
significant action to help restore it to power").
110.
See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as
a Lockean System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1559 (2004) (arguing for a robust
internationalist collective security mechanism premised in Locke's political theory); cf.
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53
passim (1992) ("m[International law and domestic justice are fundamentally connected."
(footnote omitted)); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973) (discussing the
overlap between Kantian and Lockean theories of justice and social contracts); John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1993), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 529,
559 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (discussing the same in the context of international
law).
111.
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 7 (C. B.
Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE] (rejecting that
"men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it,
and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and
rebellion .... ).
112.
See LEVIATHAN, supra note 87, at 148.
113.
See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 91 (arguing that
compulsion by a robber or a state is similarly unjust and does not entitle either to the
spoils of their wrongdoing).
See id.
114.
115.
See id. at 63.
116.

See, e.g., GEORGE H. SMITH, THE SYSTEM OF LIBERTY: THEMES IN THE

HISTORY OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 106 (2013) (noting that for Locke, "it is absurd to
suppose that people would join a civil society to become worse off than they would have
been in a state of nature - and worse off they would certainly be, if in a civil society
their property, liberty, and lives would be at the mercy of an absolute sovereign and his
or her arbitrary decrees" (footnote omitted)).
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Hobbes' rejection of the philosophical premise of Locke's natural
executive power is obviously connected to his concern to establish the
sovereignty. To
absolute
moral grounds for
rational and
Hobbes . . . . [t]he contract forming political society is a product of
consent, but this act of consent is not the efficient cause of sovereign
power. Rather the sovereign derives his or her authority by virtue of
being the single uncontracted agent watching over society while
retaining his or her natural freedom entire.

11 7

To Hobbes, freedom permitted individuals to subject themselves
completely to thugs out of a hope of protection."18 To Locke, any such
choice would be by definition unfree because it was the subject of
force or fear and thus void the social contract based upon consent so
obtained.11 9
Applying the Lockean conception of freedom in a revolutionary
context such as Ukraine, choices made under gunfire, or threat of
military action, are always inherently suspect.1 20 They are prone to
involve precisely the kinds of situations where a reasonable person
may well not feel safe-and thus constrained by outside events to
assent to political actions that he or she would not have otherwise
21
agreed to.1

This doubt is the stronger in the context of a constitutional
democracy.1 22 Democracies would provide the people with a relatively
efficacious mechanism to change governments and government policy
in an ordinary manner. 123 To the extent elections are not

117.
LEE WARD, JOHN LOCKE AND MODERN LIFE 75 (2010) (footnote omitted).
118.
See LEVIATHAN, supra note 87, at 118.
See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 91 (arguing that
119.
compulsion by a robber or a state is similarly unjust and does not entitle either to the
spoils of their wrongdoing); Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the
Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 560 (2007) ("Locke's justification for rejection of
arbitrary royalist power, his rationale for revolution, lies in his view that illegitimate
and arbitrary exercise of authority are not within the range of consent provided by its
citizens."); Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 97, 116 (2013) (discussing the link between tacit consent and the right to revolution).
120.
See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 91. On Locke's theory of
a right to revolution in the Second Treatise, see id. at 78; see also DAVID LLOYD
THOMAS, ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT 60 (2013)
("Without that trust the constitutional form will lack legitimacy for that political
community. The scene for a rebellion is set, therefore, when a majority of the
community have withdrawn their trust, thereby leaving the constitution, and the
people empowered under it, without legitimacy.").
121.
See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supranote 111, at 91.
122.
See Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995-96 (1991)
("Locke's right of revolution proceeded from the theory that any illegal alteration of the
constitution dissolved it and authorized society to establish a new one." (footnote
omitted)).
123.
See generally Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez & Mila Versteeg,
When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013) (discussing constitutionally recognized rights to rebel on
the basis of comparative constitutional law scholarship).
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accompanied by tactics of thuggish intimidation, their results are a
far better gauge of the free will of the governed. Thus, the notion that
unconstitutional change is nevertheless legitimate would undergo
strict scrutiny under this theory of freedom-and would lose to the
extent the malcontents have not lost confidence in the constitutional
form legitimating the actions of their government but simply in the
actions of their government. 124 Right and might thus appear poised at
an impasse-they appear on their face incommensurate.' 2 5
D. Process- InternationalLaw as Balance
The conceptions of freedom underlying the arguments made by
all parties in the Ukrainian conflict rely upon incommensurable
comprehensive theories of value. 126 They cannot be reconciled
logically or by means of formal dialectics. 2 7 When such reconciliation
or development is impossible what remains is balance. 128
But incommensurability creates significant problems for
balancing, too. It deprives balancing of a unit. As Justice Scalia
remarked:
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the
Court then proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is
ordinarily called "balancing," but the scale analogy is not really
appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is
more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular
rock is heavy. All I am really persuaded of by the Court's opinion is that
the burdens the Court labels "significant" are more determinative of its
decision than the benefits it labels "important." Were it not for the brief
implication that there is here a discrimination unjustified by any state
interest, . . . I suggest an opinion could as persuasively have been
written coming out the opposite way.129

Is it possible then to achieve a balance without a common unit of
measurement? Can balance incorporate or compare incommensurable
values?
Process theory on its face provides a means to achieve such a
balance.' 30 It relies upon a synthetic meaning-creating process to

124.
See THOMAS, supra note 120, at 60.
125.
See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 796 (quoted above).
126.
On the problem of incommensurability of value in Greek ethics, see
generally NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41.
127.
Cf. id. at 63-82.
128.
See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of
Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1384 (2001) ("The law often seeks
to weigh
and balance values that are heterogeneous
and sometimes
incommensurable.").
129.
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
130.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term - Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1994)
("[L]aw is an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or institutions.").
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understand how these conceptions of freedom relate to one
another.18 ' It then determines which argument, viewed in its totality,
is most successful in comparing its claim factually to past instances
in which freedom was a cognizable legal argument. 3 2
Such a synthetic meaning-creating process functions like a
language.' 3 3 Instead of consulting an axiomatic definition, a synthetic
process makes connections between the new event or situation and
past experiences. 134 For example, when determining whether a
cinematically-produced massive multiplayer online game (MMO)
really is a movie or a game, it makes little sense to look to a definition
of a movie or the definition of a game.' 3 5 The cinematically produced
MMO will meet elements of both definitions.1 3 6 It is "a recording of
moving images that tells a story and that people watch on a screen or
television."'3 7 But it is also "a physical or mental activity or contest
that has rules and that people do for pleasure."1 38 In the case of an
MMO, a participant in the relevant process would look for examples
of similar movie experiences to an MMO-perhaps attempts at
movies in which the audience can determine which ending will be
shown.1 39 Our process participant would also look for examples of
similar game experiences to an MMO.14 0
For instance, assume for a moment that such a dispute
concerned George Lucas and his agreement with 20th Century Fox
relating to the Star Wars franchise entered into in 1973. 141

131.
See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2007) (discussing the meaning-creating process in relation to the
Constitution).
132.
Cf. Frid~ric G. Sourgens, Law's Laboratory, Developing InternationalLaw
on Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 181, 233 (2014)
(explaining how the international law of investment protection functions like a
language).
133.
See id.
134.
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, in 1
WITTGENSTEIN WERKAUSGABE 276-78 (Suhrkamp Verlag ed., 1984) (discussing the
family resemblance theory of semantics).
135.
See MMO Definition, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW, available at 2013 WL
3212792 (C.C.H.) ("A massively multiplayer online videogame (also called MMOG) ...
is capable of supporting hundreds or thousands of players simultaneously.").
136.
See Game Overview, STAR WARS: THE OLD REPUBLIC, http://www.swtor.com/
info/overview (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) [http://perma.cclU9BW-N2Y7] (archived Feb.
19, 2015) (describing the cinematic content of the MMO).
137.

Movie Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE

DICTIONARY,

http://www

.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/movie (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/XLC7W7GN] (archived Feb. 17, 2015).
138.

Game Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE DICTIONARY,

http://www

.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/game (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) [http//perma.cc5FSNBHG5] (archived Feb. 17, 2015).
139.
See supra note 137.
140.
See supra note 138.
141.
See Brian Warner, How One BrilliantDecision in 1973 Made George Lucas
a Multi-Billionaire Today, CELEBRITYNETWORTH.COM (May 1, 2014), http://www
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Hypothetically, assume that George Lucas had not retained the right
to both merchandising and sequels at that time, but simply to "games
and toys" based on the movie.1 42 In 2012, Lucas releases Star Wars:
Old Republic, a story-based MMO involving voice acting, cutting edge
animation, and a cinematic story arch for those who persevere long
enough to play to higher character levels.1 43 Looking at an MMO in
today's environment, there are multiple generations of both storybased videogames and role playing games available for comparison. 144
The relationship between Star Wars: Old Republic and games
therefore is comparatively strong.
But what if we had to determine what George Lucas and Fox
intended in 1973 with regard to a fictional agreement to permit Lucas
to market games?1 45 How would the change in time change the
interpretation of "game" or "movie?" In that context, today's computer
games would appear as even more outrageous science fiction than
Lucas' famous Death Star.1 4 6 Dungeons and Dragons, the world's
most famous role playing franchise, had not yet premiered its first
tabletop game (it would appear in 1974).147 But during the same time
frame, an interactive movie-Kinoautomat-was first screened in
1967 at the Montreal Expo and rescreened in San Antonio in 1968,
Prague in 1971 and 1972, and at the Spokane Expo in 1974.148
Different experience meaningfully changes the balance whether Star
Wars: Old Republic meaningfully is a game or a movie.
Once the process participant has determined the population of
analogues and the relationship between a new item and these
analogues, the process participant can make a judgment whether the
.celebritynetworth.comlarticles/entertainment-articles/how-one-genius-decision-made-georgelucas-a-billionaire/ [http://perma.cd8D35-9ZCTJ (archived Feb. 17, 2015) (describing the
then-unique terms of the original deal between Lucas and Fox).
142.
See id. (reporting that in reality, Lucas "offered to keep his salary at
$150,000 in exchange for two seemingly insignificant requests: 1) That he retain all
merchandising rights, and 2) that he would retain the rights to any sequels.").
143.
See Game Overview, STAR WARS: THE OLD REPUBLIC, supra note 136.
144.
For a discussion of these types of games, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, A First
Amendment for Second Life: What Virtual Worlds Mean for the Law of Video Games, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779 passim (2009).
145.
See, e.g., Rahim Moloo, When Actions Speak Louder than Words: The
Relevance of Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation,31 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 39, 53 (2013) (discussing the principle of contemporaneity and good faith in
international law treaty interpretation); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretationin
California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 583-84 (1998) (discussing the principle of contemporaneity and
good faith as a matter of California law).
146.
See, e.g., Mark J.P. Wolf, Introduction to BEFORE THE CRASH: EARLY VIDEO
GAME HISTORY 3 (Mark J.P. Wolf ed., 2012) (describing the types of videogames
available in the early 1970s).
147.

See, e.g., JAMES D. IVORY, VIRTUAL LIVES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 16

(2012).
148.

See NICO CARPANTIER, MEDIA AND PARTICIPATION: A SITE OF IDEOLOGICAL-

DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE 277 (2011).
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MMO is more of a movie or more of a game.1 49 The MMO then
becomes internalized in the broader "world," Lebensform, of our
0
process participant. 5
These examples show that while the abstract definitions of what
constitutes a game or movie would not have changed, at all, their
interpretation-their meaning-could in fact radically shift.1 5 This
observation confirms what we intuitively know already: our worlds
are not governed by abstract constants, or units of measurement, but
much more by our own interpretation of a pool of relevant
experience. 152 We understand by placing items in context, not by
engaging in metaphysical lexicography.1 53
This process operates analogously to transnational process
scholarship. The process begins with interaction.1 54 In the George
Lucas example, this "interaction" is the (fictional) dispute between
Lucas and his movie studio whether Star Wars: The Old Republic is a
movie or a game. 155 This interaction "forces an interpretation or
enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation."1 56 The
goal of interpretation is "not simply to coerce the other party, but to
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the
other party's internal normative system." 5 7 In the context of the
George Lucas example, the interpretation that the MMO is a game
(or movie) is internalized because the participants internalize MMOs
in an existing norm structure made up of their past experience. The
norm to call MMOs "games" or "movies" thus is not the result of
external norm-based compulsion but of internalized understanding.
Process theory submits that each internalization of a new
situation, each instance of understanding, changes the normative
world of the participant. 158 The substance of the participant's
universe is different after each interaction. 159 For instance, the

149.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 277 ("Instead of providing a common core
that all things we call language have in common, I say that these phenomena do not
have one thing in common causing us to use the same word. Instead they are all
related to each other in many different ways." (author's translation)).
150.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 250 ("[T]he speaking of a language is part
of an activity, or form of life (Lebensform)." (author's translation)).
151.
See supra notes 145, 149 and accompanying text.
152.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 278 ("And the result of our enquiry states:
we see a complicated network of resemblances that interweave and crisscross.
Resemblances big and small." (author's translation)).
153.
Id.
154.
See Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2646.
155.
See id.
156.
Id.
Id.
157.
158.
See id. ("[E]ventually, repeated participation in the process will help to
reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the process."
(footnote omitted)).
159.
See Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 253.
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universe in our example is enriched both by the MMO and the new
connection between MMO and past instances of movies and games.
By approaching balance in this manner, process theory can
answer Justice Scalia's criticism. 160 In the context of the MMO
example, it is a comparison whether something is more of a movie or
more of a game rather than whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy. But both comparisons look not to a common
unit of measurement, but balance the belonging of a particular object
in light of the strength of its relationship to incommensurable values.
In the context of the MMO example, we saw how that balancing
works without a unit measurement.1 61 It contextualizes MMOs by
reference to existing factual examples of games. It is possible to judge
which characteristic of MMOs (or interest of litigants) is more
important by the overall factual analogy. 162 While each factual
analogy is driven by completely different standards, it is possible to
compare these analogies by reference to the closeness in family
resemblances between each analogy and the relevant closest test
sample. 163 Process permits judgment, balance, by placing each
specific case to be analyzed within the map of earlier experiences that
have already been processed.
This act of situating an event within a broader set of experiences
explains how apparently incommensurable interests relate to each
other. The interests are only analytically incommensurable.1 64 The
interests as a matter of definition concern very different ultimate

160.
Cf. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161.
In fact, linguistic understanding by definition lacks such a common
denominator. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 134, at 276.
162.
See id. at 278.
163.
See id. at 276.
164.
See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG, BEITRAGE ZUR
DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHSSTAATS 309-24 (1992)

(discussing the analytical problem of balancing tests by critiquing the work of Robert
Alexy); see also Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption, and the ConstrainingRole
of Legal Text, 4 LAw & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 34, 35-37 (2010) (discussing Alexy's
balancing theory and Habermas' critique); cf. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 102 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002) ("These expressions point to
a constitutive rule for balancing exercises undertaken by the Federal Constitutional
Court which goes like this: (A) The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or
detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.
This rule expresses a law for balancing all types of principles, and it can be called the
Law of Balancing. According to the Law of Balancing, the permissible level of nonsatisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle depends on the importance of satisfying
the other. In defining principles, the clause 'relative to the legally possible' puts what
the principle in question requires into relation with what competing principles require.
The Law of Balancing states what this relation amounts to. It makes it clear that the
weight of principles can never be determined independently or absolutely, but that one
can only ever speak of relative weight." (footnotes omitted)).
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values. These values lack a meaningful common denominator.16 5 But
they are still historically and socially related.
For instance, we can compare Ovid's Metamorphoses to
Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet from a historical perspective despite
the fact that one is an epic poem and the other a tragic play, one
written in Latin and other written in English, one written for literati
and the other for a general audience. 166 As matter of common
analytical measure, they have nothing in common. As a matter of
historical accident, they have everything in common.16 7 Shakespeare
weaves Ovidian themes into the heart of the Elizabethan Renaissance
and in so doing changed the sensibilities of Englishmen and women
forever.1 68 This observation makes sense from the point of view of a
literary social process.16 9 It makes no sense from Justice Scalia's
antiseptic jurisprudential perch. 7 0
From a social perspective, our very understanding of the tragedy
of a play like Romeo and Juliet depends upon our ability to inhabit

165.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 256: "Imagine someone points to a vase
and says: "'look at that marvelous blue! - the shape does not matter.' Or: 'look at that
marvelous shape! - the color is unimportant.' There is no doubt that you would do
different things when you follow these instructions." Color and shape have no
cognizable common denominator. But the manner in which we encountered the vase
gave us an example in which color and shape factually intersected by historical
accident. That example provides a tangible means to determine why shape sometimes
may be more important than color. In so doing, it provides a means to compare shape
and color even though they have absolutely nothing in common other than a historical
link between our experiences of the color blue and the shape of a vase.
166.
On the Ovidian theming in Romeo and Juliet, see, for example, Subha
Mukherji, Outgrowing Adonis, Outgrowing Ovid, The DisorientingNarrative of Venus
and Adonis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SHAKESPEARE'S POETRY 396, 412 (Jonathan

F.S. Post ed., 2013) ("In that other early work, Romeo and Juliet, it is an Ovidian
allusion that flickers like a stab of pain through Shakespearean poetry at its most
absolute, which is also Juliet's unwitting liebestod." (emphasis added)); see also
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE'S ROMEO AND JULIET 69 (Harold Bloom ed.,

2009) (noting

Shakespeare's reputation as an English Ovid).
167.
See, e.g., LYNETTE HUNTER & PETER LICHTENFELS, NEGOTIATING
SHAKESPEARE'S LANGUAGE IN ROMEO AND JULIJET READING STRATEGIES FROM
CRITICISM, EDITING AND THE THEATRE 13 (2009) (noting the direct influence of Arthur

Golding's translation of the Metamorphoses on Shakespeare, as well as the indirect
influence of Ovid through the works of Marlowe and Lyly).
168.

See DAVID L. FROST, THE SCHOOL OF SHAKESPEARE: THE INFLUENCE OF

SHAKESPEARE ON ENGLISH DRAMA 1600-42, at 1 (1968) ("There could be no greater
indictment of the aesthetic and intellectual pretensions of an age than to say that it
failed to appreciate Shakespeare."); Jessica Wolfe, Classics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF SHAKESPEARE 517, 524 (Arthur F. Kinney ed., 2012) ("Ovid's influence on
Shakespeare is as varied as it is complex: his poems shape Shakespeare's
comprehension of dramatic genre, his treatment of gender and erotic desire, and his
understanding of cosmic change and recurrence.").
169.
See Pierre Legrand, Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help, 21 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 595, 609 (2011).
170.
Cf. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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multiple incommensurable social worlds all at once. 171 Choice is
tragic (rather than stupid) because we understand the powerful
gravitational force of conflicting values, or social roles, in a given
situation. 172 In Romeo and Juliet, Romeo's obligations (1) of
friendship to Mercurio, (2) to abide the laws of Verona, and (3) to
protect his new wife's family conflict when Tybalt and Mercurio
duel.173 Should Romeo protect his newly minted cousin by marriage
from Mercurio?' 7 4 When Tybalt kills Mercurio, should Romeo avenge
his friend?17 5 Or should Romeo abide by the law and let the Prince
punish Tybalt?1 76 Or should Romeo protect Juliet's beloved cousin
from the law?1 77 Once Tybalt kills Mercurio, it apparently is no
longer possible for Romeo to meet the demands of all of his social
roles-he either avenges his friend, or he abides the law, or he
protects his cousin. 178 We understand this pull because we can
imagine being in a similar situation. 179 Process theory precisely does
not blindly ignore that people frequently act in the context of such
conflicting values. 180 And that interaction with others requires
mediation between these values rather than an all out choice of one

171.
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, PE, supra note 41, at 269 (discussing the tragic choice
in Antigone by reference to the incommensurable social roles she inhabits).
172.
See id.
173.

See WILLAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 3, sc. 1.

174.
See id. ("Draw, Benvolio; beat down their weapons. / Gentlemen, for shame,
forbear this outrage! / Tybalt, Mercutio, the prince expressly hath / Forbidden
bandying in Verona streets: / Hold, Tybalt! good Mercutio!").
175.
See id. ("Alive, in triumph! and Mercutio slain! / Away to heaven, respective
lenity, / And fire-eyed fury be my conduct now!").
176.
See id. at act 1, sc. 1 (Prince: "If ever you disturb our streets again, I Your
lives shall pay the forfeit of the peace.").
177.
See id. at act 3, sc. 2 (Juliet having found out that Romeo killed Tybalther dearly loved cousin-exclaims "0 serpent heart, hid with a flowering face! / Did
ever dragon keep so fair a cave? / Beautiful tyrant! fiend angelical! / Dove-feather'd
raven! wolvish-ravening lamb! / Despised substance of divinest show! / Just opposite to
what thou justly seem'st, I A damned saint, an honourable villain!").
178.
See id. at act 3, sc. 1 ('This gentleman, the prince's near ally, I My very
friend, hath got his mortal hurt / In my behalf; my reputation stain'd / With Tybalt's
slander,--Tybalt, that an hour I Hath been my kinsman!").
179.
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 53 (describing a scene "of
ordinary practical deliberation" in Antigone that "[m]ost members of the audience
would recognize . .. [as] part of their own daily lives").
180.
See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93
GEO. L.J. 487, 559-64 (2005) (discussing how the transnational legal process addresses
norm conflicts in the municipal legal context).
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over the other; 18 x process does not deny the tragedy of choice but
provides a means to choose, eyes wide open.1 8 2
Process theory therefore can make perfect sense of balancing
international legal norms. In the context of Ukraine, it does not
matter that the arguments of the United States and Russia each
continue to rely upon inconsistent and incongruent premises, that is,
Realpolitik and constitutional justifications. 8 3 As participants in the
practice of international law, process theory posits that we intuitively
understand that these arguments seek to establish family
relationships between each side's respective legal arguments about
the Ukrainian crisis and past instances in which similar civil strife
became a matter of international legal concern. 184 In this vein, the
arguments of Russia draw on the Kosovo example to lend global
credence to its claims that Crimea appropriately seceded from
Ukraine. 185 They further rely upon older claims of pan-Slavic
protectionism against Western incursion for a more regional
audience.1 86 Finally, it contextualizes the Ukrainian revolution in
Kyiv as illegitimate by reference to behind the scenes Western
intervention in the domestic political process of a country suiting its
geopolitical interests.1 8 7
The United States on the other hand evokes other examples,
most centrally the break-up of the Soviet Union and President
Yeltsin's rise to power in Russia. 8 8 For more local consumption, it

181.
See NUSSBAUM, PE, supra note 41, at 270 ("If the political sphere decides,
wisely, to recognize plural spheres of value, it thereby builds in the permanent
possibility of tragic clashes among them.").
182.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 81 ("[A]s Heraclitus put it, justice
really is strife: that is, that the tensions that permit this sort of strife are also, at the
same time, partly constitutive of the values themselves.").
183.
See supra Part II.A.
184.
See Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 276.
185.
See supra Part II.A. For a discussion on the overlapping Realpolitik and
internationalist arguments in the context of Kosovar independence, and their
problematic nature at the time of their making, see Jure Vidmar, InternationalLegal
Responses to Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779
passim (2009).
186.
See supra Part IIA; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sarig Armenian & David
McClure, Stoney Road out of Eden: The Struggle to Recover Insurance for Armenian
Genocide Deaths and its Implications for the Future of State Authority, Contract Rights,
and Human Rights, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2012) (describing the panSlavic motivations of the Czar in entering into the Crimean War in the 1850s).
187.
See supra Part II.A; A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53
ST. LouIs U. L.J. 485, 508-11 (2009) (discussing the more or less covert role of the
United States in Chilean internal politics in the Johnson and Nixon administrations).
188.
See supra Part II.A; see also David Golove, Liberal Revolution,
Constitutionalismand the Consolidationof Democracy:A Review of Bruce Ackerman's
The Future of Liberal Revolution, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1591, 1597 n.9 (1993) ("Ackerman,
indeed, has applauded Yeltsin's approach, noting the parallels with the conduct of
George Washington after the American Revolution.").
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further links the events to human rights narratives of civil rights
movements and popular political protests.18 9 Finally, it contextualizes
Russian presence in Ukraine as aggression-with obvious parallels to
Soviet incursions into Budapest and Prague.1 9 0 These arguments
thus do not treat Ukraine as analytical legal problem to be resolved
by the application of a "freedom rule."191 They seek to situate Ukraine
in a broader context of the international legal discourse itself.' 9 2 By
doing so, both the United States and Russia attempt to persuade
participants to internalize the current conflict in a different
manner-and draw diametrically opposed normative conclusions
concerning it. 1 9 3
Process theory resolves the dispute by comparing the strength of
family resemblance between the respective arguments, on the one
hand, and our internal web of past freedom norm applications, on the
other hand.1 94 These arguments thus seek to make relevant the
whole of range of freedom norms to strengthen family resemblance
rather than to focus on a single axiomatic argument-an axiomatic
argument that never is reflected in all its purity in past instances of
norm application. 195
In this sense, the transnational legal process can make sense of
freedom in the context of the past practice of transnational law. 196
This practice, of course, is heavily defined by historical accident-that
is, the store of experience or cases studied by transnational law
practitioners.' 9 7 Freedom in this sense ceases to be a value with any
claim to exclusivity and simply becomes one of many-a data point in
the larger historical fabric. 198 The worst of the critique of
international law thus is, at first, averted.
But this conclusion does not at all help to clarify if the
transnational process has any independent value.19 9 Quite to the
contrary, it suggests that the transnational legal process must lack

189.
190.

See supraPart II.A.
See supra Part IIA; see also Ferenc A. Vli, Soviet Satellite and
InternationalLaw, 15 JAG J. 169 passim (1961) (discussing Soviet suppression of civic
uprisings in Budapest and Prague).
191.
Cf. Robert Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, 57 LoY. L. REV. 29, 53
(2011) ("Neoconservatives, however, were even more emphatic and enskied the [United
States] as the leading power that provided a 'geopolitical framework for widespread
economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy'
throughout the world." (footnote omitted)).
192.
Comparesupra Part IIA, with Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2645-46.
193.
Comparesupra Part II.A, with Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2645-46.
194.
See Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 276.
195.
Cf. supra Part H.A.
196.
Compare supra Part IIA, with Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2645-46.
197.
Compare supra Part IIA, with Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2645-46.
198.
Cf. NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 59-63 (noting the problem with
purely civic virtue).

199.

See id.
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such value. 200 Any use of value would undermine what process is
about. 20 1 It would appear to force what is currently an experiencebased, synthetic process of meaning creation to become a deductive
value-applying calculus. Thus, the question: has process theory
pushed freedom-the value people from Cato to William Wallace to
Patrick Henry were willing to die for-to the vanishing point? Has it
engaged merely in another strategy of evasion to delay the
Koskenniemian critique's inevitable conclusion that all law is politics
by different means? 202

III. WHOSE FREEDOM: STATES, PEOPLES, OR PEOPLE?

Given the international legal nature of the Ukrainian crisis and
others like it, the first question is who should be free. 208 There are
three plausible candidates. Freedom can apply to states, 20 4 it can
apply to peoples, 20 5 and it can apply to people. 2 06
As the Ukrainian crisis shows, transnational legal arguments
about freedom invoke all three of these dimensions at the same time.
Both the United States and Russia rely upon state-based freedom,
accusing the other of inappropriately interfering in Ukrainian
internal affairs. 207 Russia also relies upon the right of areas with
majority ethnic Russian populations, such as Crimea, to declare their

200.
Compare NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 59-63, with Koh, Obey, supra
note 14, at 2645-46 (explaining that civic discourse mediates existing value
commitments of civic discourse participants).
201.
Compare NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 65, with Koh, Obey, supra note
14, at 2645-46.
202.
See Koskenniemi, Politics, supra note 24, passim (noting that "some
measure of politics is inevitable" in the "fight for an international Rule of Law").
203.
For a discussion on the definitional importance of defining who is covered
by the right to freedom, see, for example, ScoTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS:

THE

DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION 164-66 (1995) (examining the 1857 United States Supreme Court
Dred Scott case and the tension between slavery and the United States Declaration of
Independence).
204.
See infra Part III.A.
205.
See infra Part III.B.
206.
See infra Part III.C.
207.
See Deputy Assistant Secretary, Eric Rubin, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Ukraine: Statement Before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee (March 6, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/p/
eur/rls/rmI/2014/mar/223023.htm [http://perma.cc/3P97-W922] (archived Jan. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter Rubin March 6, 2014 Statement] ("Russia's actions in Crimea are in clear
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and a breach of
international law.. . ."); Brian D. Taylor, Putin's Own Goal: The Invasion of Crimea
and Putin'sPoliticalFuture, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs
.com/articles/141010/brian-d-taylor/putins-own-goal [http//perma.cc/TEW3-2NZE] (archived
Feb. 19, 2015) (noting that Putin "blamed the West for interference in Ukraine").
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independence.2 0 8 This argument moves from states as the appropriate
subjects of freedom and looks instead to peoples as having the legally
cognizable right to be free. 209 Finally, both the United States and
Russia rely upon individual freedom by arguing that the United
States interfered in the Ukrainian constitutional process or that
Russia is seeking to thwart the will of the people in the streets with
brute force. 21 0
The Ukrainian crisis also shows that these arguments
meaningfully conflict. A pure statist view ignores that ethnic groups
and individuals are frequently oppressed. 211 A view premised
exclusively in the freedom of peoples would seem to permit a tyranny
of the majority over dispersed ethnic minorities. 212 A conception of
the primacy of individual rights renders national borders and
community attachments largely irrelevant. 213 The challenge thus is
this: for transnational legal process to value freedom in its own right
rather than simply make sense of assertions about freedom for a
given case in light of conflicting norm attachments of its participants,
the transnational legal process must conceptualize freedom in a way
that incorporates all of these apparently conflicting subjects. 214

208.
See, e.g., Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra
note 9 (discussed in Part IIA).
209.
See id.
210.
See id. (relying upon constitutionality as mark of legitimacy); U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: UKRAINE (2013) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT UKRAINE], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220554.pdf
(last visited July 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/A6TK-M38A] (archived Feb. 15, 2015).
211.
See, e.g., Raghida Dargham, Oman Says it Will Not Interfere in Syria's
Internal Affairs, AL-MONITOR.COM (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
tr/politics/2012/10/oman-no-to-interference-in-syria.html# [http://perma.cc/S9L8-NXDR]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (reporting a statement by Oman's Foreign Minister to that
effect).
212.

See,

e.g.,

DAVID

RAil,

STATEHOOD

AND

THE

LAW

OF

SELF-

DETERMINATION 280 (2002) ("One has often sought to justify majority decision-making
procedures on the basis of moral considerations or as a method inherent in the
collective right of self-determination.... However, the so-called 'tyranny of the
majority' is an inherent threat and possibility of such a decision-making
procedure .... ).
213.
See, e.g., David Beetham, Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan
Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING

POLITICAL COMMUNITY:

STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN

DEMOCRACY 58, 59 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that human rights
law sets up a cosmopolitan regulatory space).
214.
The same problem plagues ethical theories. There is a significant antitheoretical push in the philosophical community that argues precisely that it is
possible to make meaningful statements about ethics and ethical choices without being
able to systemize these statements into an ethical theory. See, e.g., ANTI-THEORY IN
ETHICS AND MORAL CONSERVATISM passim (Stanley G. Clarke & Evan Simpson eds.,
1989) (setting out such a position).
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Freedom must be an individual right and a social norm all at once. 215
If the transnational legal process fails to do so, freedom in the
transnational legal process becomes an empty shell even before we
ask any questions about its substance: we would not even be able to
identify to whom this mysterious freedom applies let alone what it
means. 216
A. States - Sovereign Equality
Freedom in international law traditionally applies to states. 21 7
International law classically is the law of state-to-state relations. 218
Transnational legal process scholarship does not deny that it applies
to this realm. 219 Quite to the contrary, state-to-state conduct is a
fixed axis for its application.22 0
State-based freedom in orthodox international law operates in
three interrelated ways. First, freedom refers to the absence of an
international hegemon. 221 No state could dictate to another state
what it ought to do simply by virtue of status. 222 States are thus free
in the sense that they are equal-they are not subject to any other.22 3

215.
Cf. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 306 (2009) (arguing that there is
room for multiple perspectives of freedom at a time without necessarily creating
irreconcilable tension).
216.
Cf. Koskenniemi, Politics, supra note 24, at 61 ("It is impossible to make
substantive decisions within the law which would imply no political choice.").
217.

See, e.g., JAN ANNE

VOS, THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 281 (2013) ("[R]ules of public international law containing obligations are linked
to the assumption of a freedom of States .. .").
218.
See, e.g., I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, General
Course on Public International Law, in 198 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 31 (1986) ("The
doctrine dominant in the nineteenth century considered international law as the law
dealing exclusively with the relations between States.").
219.
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An Integrated
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 473 (2005) (arguing that
transnational law includes traditional international law).
220.
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 18, at 1401 (1999) (defining state-to-state
processes as a horizontal dimension of the transnational legal process).
221.
See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
843, 845 (2001) ("The received body of international law is based on the idea of the
equality of states.").
222.
See, e.g., Josd E. Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 873, 887 (2003) ("The risks that unilateral [hegemony] poses to international
law and its formal principles, such as sovereign equality, are grave, but they are
obvious.").
223.
See Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether
Transnational Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 385, 413 (2010) (noting the existence of "a fundamental
principle of sovereign equality [that] Vattel described as 'the natural liberty of nations'
(footnote omitted)).
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Second, classically a state cannot be bound by an international
legal rule to which it did not in some form consent.2 24 Most obviously,
in the law of treaties obligation is a matter of state assent. 225
Similarly, customary international law is premised in objective state
conduct and subjective state belief that its conduct follows a rule,
which is indeed legally binding. 2 26 Even though custom might bind a
state that did not expressly assent to the customary rule, classic
international law constructs tacit consent from the state's failure
persistently to object to the rule. 227 While less clear, it appears that a
state should be able to opt out of general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.2 28 That states cannot be bound by a rule to which
they did not agree flows directly from sovereign equality. States are
free because they cannot be made to do anything against their will. 229
Third, it guarantees that international law cannot interfere in
the domestic affairs of any state. 230 The domestic affairs of a state are
its own to organize as it pleases. 231 Paternalistically, the family
father is freest in his own home-so the state in its own territory. 232

224.
See VoS, supra note 217, at 281 (noting the link between freedom and
international law formation).
225.
See, e.g., Omar M. Dajani, Contractualism in the Law of Treaties, 34 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 40 (2012) (noting the declaration issued by the conferees in Vienna
denouncing 'the threat or use of pressure in any form, military, political, or economic,
by any State, in order to coerce another Statute to perform any act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty"').
226.
See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
146, 149 (1987) (discussing the relationship between state conduct and subjective state
belief that conduct is compelled by an international legal rule).
227.
See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529, 544 (1993) (arguing that customary norms form in the context of debate at
multilateral fora, in which "[clonsensus, defined as the lack of expressed objections to
the rule by any participant, may often be sufficient. The absence of objections, of
course, amounts to tacit consent by participants that do not explicitly support the
norm.").

228.
See Michael D. Nolan & Frid6ric Gilles Sourgens, Issues of Proofof General
Principlesof Law in InternationalArbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505,
510 (2009) (noting that "to the extent that there is a regional nexus to a dispute - as is
frequently the case in bilateral treaty disputes - reference to the legal systems of the
contracting parties, as well as their state practice, may be appropriate" (footnote
omitted)).
229.
See VOS, supra note 217, at 281.
230.
See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), pmbl., U.N. Doe. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970)
(including as a principle "[t]he duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter").
231.
See id.
232.

Compare KATE COOPER, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN HOUSEHOLD 108-11

(2007) (discussing the role of the paterfamilias in Roman law and its use in Roman
political theory), with G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 230, pmbl. (delimiting the territorial
power of the sovereign). See also David Wippman, Treaty-BasedIntervention: Who Can
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This view of freedom dovetails most clearly with the Hobbesian view
of liberty. 233 The state is sovereign, meaning that it is not obligated to
anyone. 234 It can act with complete freedom because it cannot be
made to do anything against its own will. 2 35

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this view of freedom casts sovereigns in
a dystopian "state of nature." 2 36 A state has no obligation to anyoneits own subjects, other states, other states' subjects-unless that state
has assented to the obligation. 237 This gives free reign to states to
''persuade" each other to consent so long as they have not agreed to
some limits on their rights to persuade in the law of war or some
other conventional or customary rule.238 Similarly unsurprisingly,
this view is closely associated with Realpolitik.2 39 Its rhetoric of equal
Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 passim (1995) (discussing the principle of nonintervention in the context of requests for intervention).
233.
See Michael W. Doyle & Geoffrey S. Carlson, Silence of the Laws?
Conceptions of International Relations and International Law in Hobbes, Kant, and
Locke, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 648, 650 (2008) ("Despite his rejection of the
possibility of an international law of peace, Hobbes accepts the modern view of
sovereign equality.").
234.
See WARD, supra note 117, at 75 (describing Hobbes' view of the sovereign
as sole uncontracted person in the social contract).
235.
But see Isaak I. Dore, Deconstructingand ReconstructingHobbes, 72 LA. L.
REV. 815, 832-34 (2012) (indicating that Hobbes' only constraint on the sovereign
would be God); see also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: REVISED STUDENT EDITION lxiv (Richard
Tuck ed., 1996) (1651) (noting the literature discussing the rather complicated religious
views of Thomas Hobbes).
236.
See Richard Falk, Re-Framing the Legal Agenda of World Order in the
Course of a Turbulent Century, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 451, 452 (1999)
("It is Hobbes' insistence that the absence of a governing authority outside the
sovereign state created an anarchy resembling 'the state of nature,' which underlies
the still prevalent skepticism about the very possibility of international law.").
237.
See VOS, supra note 217, at 281; Charney, supra note 227, at 544
(highlighting the importance of consent, even if tacit, in the context of the formation of
customary rules of international law); Dajani, supra note 225, at 40 (discussing the
freedom of consent as relating to sovereign equality in international law).
238.
See, e.g., Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement of
International Law: Countermeasures, the Non-Injured State and the Idea of
International Community 125 (2009) (discussing the position that economic embargoes
"derive[ed] authority from state practice and the fact that there was no rule of
international law prohibiting them").
239.
See Vakahn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and
International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal
Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 248 (1989) ("Germany was even more reluctant
to act on behalf of the Armenians; but unlike the other Powers, she did not equivocate
about her posture. Bismarck, who tried to dissuade England from interfering in 'the
internal affairs' of Turkey, articulated that exercise of Realpolitik with brutal
frankness." (emphasis added)). In some instances, sovereign equality-and state
freedom-is juxtaposed to a view of hegemonic Realpolitik. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender,
The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe's Practiceand the United Nations, 15
EUR. J. INT'L L. 857, 858 (2004) (juxtaposing state freedom to hegemonic Realpolitik).
Of course, this view assumes brazen hegemonic behavior rather than the use of
hegemonic power to bring about a multilateral resolution in keeping with hegemonic
intentions, which is far more difficult to juxtapose with sovereign equality in this
manner. See Alvarez, supra note 222, at 887 (suggesting that a hegemonic power can
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freedom simply masks equal impunity. 240 If there is no rule binding
the state other than the one the state agreed to, a state is prohibited
from blockading, embargoing, or bombarding another only if it agreed
to refrain from blockading, embargoing, or bombarding. 24 1 In this
sense, one state's freedom precisely would not end at the tip of its
neighbor's nose. 242

B. Peoples - Self-Determination
Understandably, post-colonial international law combines
sovereign equality with a right to self-determination to avoid this
consequence of Hobbesian freedom. 243 This right to selfdetermination attaches freedom not to the state but to the people
inhabiting its territory or a portion of its territory. 244 Freedom of
states thus is accompanied by a restriction that states may not
subjugate peoples with impunity, after all. 245 To a point, this form of
freedom has been incorporated in orthodox international law and
thus the horizontal axiom of the transnational legal process. 2 4

6

The right to self-determination followed from the break-up of the
Ottoman Empire shortly before World War I and the break-up of the

assert its influence through international organizations and that the risks associated
with such power are unclear).
240.
See Jessica Whyte, Catastrophe and Redemption: The Political Thought of
Giorgio Agamben 64 (2013) (noting the impunity with which persons could be killed in
the state of nature as the driving force toward the formation of the Hobbesian
Leviathan).
241.
See Kirgis, supra note 226, at 149 (describing how the International Court
will deem certain state practices as legally significant without examining the state's
subjective obligations to be bound by the practice or custom).
242.
See Donald J. Kochan, On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 431, 453 (2011) (discussing the place of the adage '[y]our right to swing
your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins,"' in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence (footnote omitted)).
243.
See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 82, at 603-10 (discussing the link between
decolonialization and self-determination at the end of World War II); see also Tom J.
Farer, HarnessingRogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil
Strife, 82 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514-15 (1969) (discussing the limits of self-determination
at the height of decolonialization).
244.
See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 82, at 114-31 (discussing to what or to
whom the right to self-determination attaches); see also Wojciech Kornacki, When
Minority Groups Become "People"under International Law, 25 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 59
passim (2012) (same).
245.
See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 82, at 119 ("[Iln extreme cases of
oppression, international law allows remedial secession to discrete peoples within a
State . . . ."); see also Jordan J. Paust, InternationalLaw, Dignity, Democracy, and the
Arab Spring, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5-6 (2013) (discussing the right of selfdetermination, which belongs to the people, not states, governments, or political
factions, in the context of oppression).
246.
See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 82, at 119, 602-10 (noting the
incorporation of these doctrines in constitutive UN documents).
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Austro-Hungarian Empire following World War 1.247 The right to selfdetermination historically attaches to a coherent ethnic group that
has settled in a clearly defined territory and is capable of selfgovernance. 248 For geopolitical reasons, the colonial powers victorious
in World War I did not apply the principle of self-determination to
their own colonies. 249 Nor did they permit the colonies of the
vanquished powers of World War I to declare independence. 250
Instead, the new global architecture introduced a "mandate
structure"-or colonies by another name until the sheer cost of World
War II made the coercive maintenance of empire by European powers
physically impossible.2 5
The age of Decolonialization aggressively sought to provide
former colonies another freedom-based argument. 252 It provided these
territories an argument to throw off former masters and "selfgovern." 253 Frequently, the holding of a vote was required to give
legitimacy to the declaration of independence. 254 But a simple
majoritarian vote would do to create a new sovereign. 255 From that
point forward, the new state would be free in the traditional senseand free to self-govern. The Decolonialization age ultimately pushed

247.
See Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 73, 88 (2010) ("[S]elf-determination has been a central part of aspirations
within international law since the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World
War I."); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 54 (1992) ("[T]he principle of self-determination, as championed by Wilson
and the minorities released from the embrace of the German, Russian and AustroHungarian Empires, was applied vigorously, if sometimes imperfectly, to the
vanquished lands of postwar Europe.").
248.
See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 78 (1993) (explaining that classical self-determination required (1) "a people," (2) "an
established territory," and (3) a collective decision to self-govern (quoting Franck, supra
note 247, at 52)).
249.
See CARSTEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: VERSAILLES TO IRAQ AND BEYOND 73-75 (2008)

(discussing the origin of the Mandate system).
250.
See id. at 73.
251.

See id. at 73-75; see ASHLEY JACKSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE: A VERY SHORT

INTRODUCTION 97 (2013) (noting the importance of economic bankruptcy for the decline
of the British Empire after World War II).
252.
See Alexander MacKintosh Ritchie, Victorious Youth in Peril: Analyzing
Arguments Used in Cultural Property Disputes to Resolve the Case of the Getty Bronze,
9 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 325, 348 (2009) (discussing the issue in the context of Egypt).
253.
Paula Wolff, McDougal's Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, 79
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 266, 283 (1985) ("We do not have to affirm what comes out of
these revolutionary experiences in the Third World, but we should, in deference to our
own past and to the legal tolerances connected with self-determination, acknowledge
the political autonomy of Third World countries as a reality.").
254.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 82, at 620 (discussing the confused practice with
regard to the holding of plebiscites).
255.
Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in InternationalLaw and the Demise
of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 609 (2003) ("[S]elf-determination has
long been associated with majority rule plebiscites and referendums . . . .").
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sovereign equality a step further. It affirmatively required that one
state's freedom ended at least at the tip of the nose of a former
colony. 256 For self-determination to be meaningful, former colonial
masters would have to be prohibited from interfering in a material
manner in the newly established self-governance regime. 257
This view of freedom more closely resembles a Lockean view of
freedom. 25 8 Freedom means that peoples must have a right to set up
their own civil societies. 25 9 Setting up of such civil societies functions
by majoritarian constitutional consensus. 260 The right to set up such
civil societies has to be restricted to a meaningful group to prevent
certain income groups to declare independence. 261 The most logical
criterion is a people-a social group sharing in deep historical,
cultural, and linguistic ties. 2 62 Consistent with Lockean freedom,
outside interference in this constitutional process is an assault on
freedom. 263 A person is not free.in giving his belongings to an armed
robber.264 Similarly, a people or nation is not free in giving up
anything to undo outside conquest, coercion, or duress. 265 The
prohibition against recognition of acts of conquest or coercion is a

256.
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Keynote: Sustainabilityand Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 507, 511 (2013) ("'[S]overeignty' is a correlative
concept. My freedom to swing my fist ends where your nose begins."); see Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N.Doc. 6014, at 11 (Dec. 21, 1966) (basing non-interference
in domestic affairs in the "principle of self-determination").
257.
See Robert Trissotto, Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigmfor
the Ages, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 419, 425-29 (2010) (discussing the 1970 Friendly
Relations Declaration, which promotes peace and international security, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which promotes the
right to freely pursue social and economic development, in the context of
decolonialization).
258.
See Ludsin, supra note 119, at 115-17.
259.
See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 63.
260.

JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, MINERVA'S

OWL: THE TRADITION OF WESTERN

POLITICAL THOUGHT 218 (2009) ("Trusting in the reasonableness of human beings,
Locke saw the majority as a force for reason, and he never fully developed a theory of
rights against the majority." (footnote omitted)).
261.
Cf. Jane McAdam, An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in
InternationalLaw: The Right to Leave as a Personal Liberty, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 27, 37
(2011) (positing that the Lockean right to expatriate represented a means by which one
could refuse to be part of a certain political community).
AND

262.
JAMES SUMMERS, PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: How NATIONALISM
SELF-DETERMINATION SHAPE A CONTEMPORARY LAW OF NATIONS 95 (2007)

("Although the basis for government ultimately rested with individuals,
explicitly grounded his theory in 'the body of the nation."' (footnote omitted)).
263.

See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 91.

264.
265.

See id.
See G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 256.

Locke
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constitutive principle for social contracting-it protects a free bargain
being struck and maintained. 26 6
Premising freedom in a more Lockean understanding

moves

freedom outside of the realm of Realpolitik.267 Freedom is not defined
purely by acquiescence to a certain state of affairs (no matter by what
means it has been brought about). 268 The move away from freedom as
consent gives freedom some substance. It is no longer a question of
procedure (did a state give its consent) but sets parameters to
determine whether the procedure itself was legitimate (does the
consent interfere with the constitutional order set up in a social
contract by the people in question). 26 9
Doggedly, orthodox international law does not give anywhere
near full effect to freedom as self-determination. Instead, the rhetoric
of "territorial integrity" prevents several distinct ethnic groups from
forming their own states at this point in time.2 70 Kurds are one highly
publicized group that should have a right to self-determination if the
logic of self-determination were vigorously applied. 271 But sovereign
equality-the freedom of states to rule in their territory-still
matters. 2 72 It has not been replacedby self-determination. Freedom of
states thus can still trump freedom of peoples even though the
freedom of peoples conceptually was intended to replace (colonial)
Realpolitik.
The Ukrainian crisis shows that the transnational legal process
can accommodate competing claims of territorial integrity and selfdetermination. Russia supports the annexation of Crimea on the
basis of self-determination of the ethnic Russian population in the
area. 273 This ethnic Russian population has historical (if contentious)
roots in the area. 2 74 It thus bears some family resemblance to other
self-determination cases. The United States argues on the competing
basis of territorial integrity of Ukraine.2 7 5 Ukraine has a right to rule

See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 111, at 91.
266.
See generally id. at 7.
267.
268.
See supra Part III.A.
269.
See supra Part III.A.
270.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 82, at 415-18 (noting the extreme reluctance in
contemporary international law to recognize secession outside of the colonial context).
271.
See generally Clovis Maksoud, Autonomy and Minorities: The Status of the
Kurds and the Palestinians,16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 291, 291-94 (1994).
272.
See supra Part III.A.
273.
See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra note 9
(discussed in Part II.A.).
274.
See Volodymyr Yevtoukh, The Dynamics of InterethnicRelations in Crimea,
in CRIMEA: DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 69, 73-74 (Maria Drohobycky ed.,
1995) (noting the significant Russian ethnic population in Crimea and its correlation
with the earlier depletion of the local Tartar population by the central government).
275.
See, e.g., Ambassador Powers March 19, 2014 Statement, supra note 29
(deeming Russia's military intervention in Crimea as a violation of its territorial
integrity).
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the ethnic Russian population in its borders because this population
lives in its borders. 276 The transnational legal process does not
exclude either possibility but simply seeks to establish family
resemblances to past international law problem solutions. 277
This flexibility seems to come at a price. Thus far, the
transnational legal process threateningly seems to treat freedom as a
historico-political shell rather than an independent value. 278 Or
differently put, it so far does not appear able to answer why freedom
of states and freedom of peoples are relevant without pointing to
political choices as to which it appears entirely agnostic.
C. People - IndividualFreedoms
Since the end of World War II, international law has increasingly
pushed its own sphere of application beyond simply the relationship
between states.27 9 The atrocities committed against civilians during
World War II spawned an enthusiasm within the state-to-state
context for recognition of individual human rights in international
law. 280 And the appetite of some former Great Powers to wield
military muscle to protect geopolitical interests in the name of
protecting the property interest of its nationals created the necessary
space to contemplate depoliticizing property disputes and providing
international economic actors direct international legal rights. 28 1
In pushing the boundaries of international law, human rights in
particular have shifted the subject of freedom from the state, or even
a people, to individuals.2 82 Individuals are subject neither to the
absolute rule by a state nor to the majoritarian constraint of the civil

276.
See id.
277.
See supra Part IID.
278.
See generally KOSKENNIEMI, UTOPIA, supra note 10, at 67 (illustrating how
the contradictory dynamics of international legal arguments, with respect to competing
doctrines, make it impossible to prefer either side of the argument).
279.
See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982) ("Just as the
French Revolution ended the divine rights of kings, the human rights revolution that
began at the 1945 San Francisco Conference of the United Nations has deprived the
sovereign states of the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under
international law.").
280.
David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377, 1413 (1985) ("Modern
human rights advocacy was born in a burst of energy after the Second World War to
people who wanted to respond to nonmilitary atrocities that seemed unthinkable,
incomprehensible, even banal. . . .").
281.
See, e.g., ANTONIO PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 23-24 (2012) (noting the
involvement of the World Bank to settle claims arising out of the nationalization by
Egypt of the Suez dam and the failed invasion of Egypt by French and British forces).
282.
See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Jurisdictionand Human Rights Accountability
in Indian Country, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 355, 368 (2013) ("Human rights treaties
usually recognize rights of individuals and impose obligations on state parties to
ensure and respect those rights." (footnote omitted)).
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society to which they belong.2 83 Human rights instruments instead
establish that individuals are immediately free as a matter of
international law. 284

The most celebrated freedoms in human rights instruments give
individuals an international legal right to be free from the arbitrary
imposition of power. 285 The individual thus is guaranteed minimum
protections against the use of coercive force by governments. 286 The
individual further is guaranteed rights to participate in the formation
of his or her government and to petition that government.2 8 7 The
individual has a right to resist any majoritarian consensus that
would force the individual to give up his or her religion, language, or
cultural heritage.28 8 The ideal behind this conception of freedom steps
beyond the Lockean social contract. 289 It requires that states and
peoples treat individuals as ends in themselves rather than means to
an end. 290

The most coherent theoretical justification for treating
individuals as ends in themselves rather than means to other people's
ends is Kantian deontology, or obligation-based morals. 29 1 Modern
social theorists relying on the Kantian tradition submit that all forms

283.
See Mykola Sorochinsky, Prosecuting Torturers, - Protecting "Child
Molesters"- Toward a Power Balance Model of Criminal Process for International
Human Rights Law, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 157, 175 (2009) (noting the anti-majoritarian
function of human rights instruments).
284.

See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (2008) ("Human rights, it seems,

must be universal, because they are possessed by human agents simply in virtue of
their normative agency.").
285.
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilitiesfor Corporationsat InternationalLaw, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
931, 937 (2004) ("[H]istorically, international human rights law has developed as a tool
to protect individuals from the arbitrary use of power by states .....
286.
Cf. id.
287.
See Franck, supra note 247, at 58-59.
288.
See Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous Peoples as International
Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 203, 259 (2010) ("Pursuant to the human rights
discourse, indigenous peoples are not recognized as possessing attributes of inherent
sovereignty pre-dating the modern nation-state, but rather; are recognized as
deserving human rights protection because of their distinct religious, cultural, and
political ways of life." (footnote omitted)).
289.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 260, at 218 ("Locke saw the majority as a force
for reason, and he never fully developed a theory of rights against the majority."
(footnote omitted)).
290.

See CLARK BUTLER, HUMAN RIGHTS ETHICS: A RATIONAL APPROACH 203

(2008) (suggesting that the UN Declaration on Human Rights requires the recognition
of persons as ends in themselves).
291.
See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush - Part II: Hamdi, The Jury
Trial, And Our Degraded Public Sphere, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 55, 82 (2008) (arguing
that Kant, who placed "the source of all authority in the rationality of the individual"
rather than in the state, is the "locus of classical liberal Western human-rights
discourse").
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of social organization must be rational.29 2 To be rational, they submit
that a person would have to assent to the form of social organization
even if he or she did not know which place he or she would inhabit in
it. 293 As the person may end up in the worst position in the social
organization, a rational actor would choose to impose material
protections for these weakest participants. 294 These material
protections are rational minimal conditions of freedom for all in
international civil society.29 5
Kantian and neo-Kantian theory posits these requirements of
rational civic organization do not stop at the threshold of
international borders. 296 Rather, Kantian and neo-Kantian theory
aspires to a cosmopolitan government guaranteeing these basic
minimum conditions of freedom to all of humanity.2 9 7 To Kantian and
neo-Kantian theorists, birth into a nation-state or ethnic group is
mere accident.2 98 The person in the hypothetical original position
determining how to organize society would in fact not even know
which ethnic group or nation-state he or she would ultimately end up
living in. 299 A rational actor therefore would require not only that a
specific state or civil society enact the rational minimum conditions of
freedom3 00 but also that these minimum conditions be put in place as
a universal norm binding all states and peoples.3 0
Arguments premised in individual freedoms recognized by
international law are strongly on display in the Ukrainian crisis.
United States arguments point to significant human rights abuses of

292.
See id.
293.
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 136-45 (discussing
the veil of ignorance in the original position of social deliberation as a direct derivative
of Kantian deontology).
294.
See id. at 149-57.
295.
See, e.g., Stelios Andreadakis, The European Convention on Human Rights,
The EU and the UK: Confronting a Heresy: A Reply to Andrew Williams, 24 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1187, 1188-90 (2013) (suggesting that human rights instruments, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights, operate "as minimum standards" of
protection).
296.
Viad Perju, Cosmopolitanism in Constitutional Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
711, 714 (2013) (noting a study that "draws specifically on Kant to define a
cosmopolitan legal order as 'a transnational legal system in which all public officials
bear the obligation to fulfill the fundamental rights of every person within their
jurisdiction, without respect to nationality or citizenship."' (footnote omitted)).
297.
See id.
298.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 311-12 ("[T]he initial
endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in
early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view.").
299.
See id. at 137 (explaining that in the original position, "[N]o one knows his
place in society, his class position or social status").
300.
See id. at 457 (noting the limitation of theories of justice in the first
instance to "a self-contained national community").
301.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 30-35 (1999) (discussing
the application of the original position to a law of peoples).
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dissidents at the hands of the ousted Ukrainian government. 302 The
United States argument is not just-or even principally-that the
Ukrainian government had counteracted the will of the majority of
Ukrainians but that it undermined basic protections for Ukrainian
citizens to be free from political persecution.3 0 3 Russian arguments
similarly rely upon human rights concerns-be it the human rights of
the ethnic Russian population throughout Ukraine. 304 The Russian
argument submits that the successful protesters are anti-Russian and
thus would discriminate against ethnic Russian Ukrainian
citizens. 305 This argument is relevant to an international legal
argument not just in the case of self-determination of a
geographically distinct area with strong historical ethnic Russian
majorities-such as Russia argues is the case in Crimea. 306 It is
relevant throughout Ukraine particularly in areas in which ethnic
Russian Ukrainians are in the minority-and thus need legal
protections against an allegedly oppressive majority.30 7
Transnational legal process theory can make sense of this new
theoretical input for the internalization of proposed interpretations of
freedom advanced by the United States and Russia. In fact, current
legal arguments draw on all three incommensurable theories as to
who is free-Ukraine, ethnic groups within Ukraine, or individual
Ukrainian residents. Transnational legal process theory therefore
needs to provide a coherent explanation how all three-state, peoples,
and people-can be relevant to a freedom analysis.

302.
Human Rights Report Ukraine, supra note 210, at 1 ("The third major
[human rights] problem was the practice of politically motivated prosecutions and
detentions, including the continued imprisonment of former prime minister Yuliya
Tymoshenko."); see also State Department January 15, 2014 Testimony, supra note 57
(reporting increased pressure on and violence towards the media).
303.
See State Department January 15, 2014 Testimony, supra note 57; see also
Kerry Statement, supra note 7 (quoted above).
304.
See generally Editorial Board, Mr. Putin'sPower Play, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2014, at A24, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/opinion/mr-putins-power
-play.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7JCG-N9Q5] (archived Jan. 20, 2015) (critiquing
Russia's human rights based arguments as hypocritical and unfounded).
305.
See id. (highlighting Putin's belief that Russians are threatened in Eastern
Ukraine).
306.
See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra note 9
(noting that the Crimean push for independence is supported by both international and
legal justifications).
307.
See Lally & Englund, supra note 69 (discussing Putin's defense of Russian
intervention in Ukraine).
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D. The TransnationalMoment - People in Society
Transnational law transcends orthodox international law by
pushing law all the way down to people in civil society. 308
Transnational law is precisely premised in rejecting that states or
potential states have a claim to exclusivity in establishing world
order.3 09 Instead, the transnational legal process, or processes, "are
manifold, simultaneous, and iterative, involving disparate actors,
applications, and flows in multiple directions." These directions
include horizontal processes between states and states, and between
states and potential states. They also include vertical processes
between states and people and diagonally between people across
transnational transactions. 310
This premise of the transnational legal process means that
freedom cannot be defined by reference to states or peoples. 3 1 ' To do
so would deprive its key insight that the transnational legal process
operates vertically as well as horizontally and thus completely
permeates national borders, depriving them of ultimate meaning or
significance. 312 As discussed below, the transnational legal process
thus must answer the question "who is free" with "people."
To avoid self-contradiction, the transnational legal process now
owes us an explanation: if "freedom" is about people rather than
peoples or states, why are arguments premised in territorial integrity
of the state or self-determination meaningful propositions in the
transnational legal process? 3 13 If the transnational legal process is
about people, then other arguments about peoples or states should
simply be translated into the metric of individual rights and
314
compared according to this single common denominator.
This question poses significant procedural problems for
transnational legal process theory.3 15 Transnational legal process

See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 184 ("[The actors in this process are not
308.
just, or even primarily, nation-states, but include nonstate actors as well.").
See, e.g., PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 3 (1956) (noting the
309.
heterogeneity of the subjects of transnational law).
See Shaffer, Process, supranote 14, at 235.
310.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing
311.
International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 671 (1998) (discussing the
incorporation of human rights norms in domestic English law by reference to the
transnational legal process).
See Shaffer, Process, supranote 14, at 235.
312.
See supra Part III.A.
313.
In other words, there would be a universal standard of reason that could be
314.
used in order to unite the apparent plurality of value commitments. For further
discussion, see generally SUSAN MENDUS, IMPARTIALITY IN MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (2002).
See, e.g., GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE
315.

CHANGE 39 (2012) (noting that "[c]onflicts among transnational legal processes often
reflect political struggles both among and within states").
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maintains that it does not impose its own conception of value but
relies upon the value structure of its participants. 316 If the
transnational legal process turns out to be exclusively about human
rights, it would be hard to resist the tug of a comprehensive neoKantian theory of justice.3 17 The transnational legal process in that
case would be a different means of viewing international relations
through the goggles of political liberalism rather than being the
meaningfully apolitical theory it claims to be.3 18
The substantive problem of adopting the human rights rationale
outright is that human rights discourse deems certain values of
process participants to be irrational-and thus invalid.319 These
values are irrational because the person in question is simply blinded
by his or her social position into accepting them. 320 Without being
born into the social position in question, rational self-interest would
suggest that the person in question simply is being hoodwinked into
supporting the social interests of others without receiving much of
anything in return. 321 The position is invalid because it is prejudiced
and ultimately oppressive to the person holding it.3 22
This view of rationality arguably assaults deeply held religious
beliefs and moral convictions of large swaths of the world's population
as irrational and invalid. 323 The measure of irrationality by which
these beliefs and convictions are deemed invalid has a distinct
European pedigree. 3 24 Imposing this European value structure as the
only measure of rationality for world society is deeply problematic for
the simple historical reason that it is the same European value

316.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture TransnationalLegal
Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 337, 339 (2004) [hereinafter
Koh, After 9/11] (noting the reliance of the transnational legal process on the
internalized normative codes of its participants).
317.
See supra Part III.C.
318.
See Part III.C (pointing out the inherent conflict of "right and might" in the
context of the Ukraine).
319.
See, e.g., Naz K. Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: Ingos and the
Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds, 19 HARV. HUM RTS. J. 191, 193-94 (2006)
("Islamic law, as currently applied in many countries, violates international human
rights law.").
Cf. NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at xxvii (noting the distorting effect of
320.
social experience and the ability to rationally critique socially internalized injustice).
Cf. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 328-29 (discussing the
321.
limitation of cultural theories as perfection by the rationality of the original position).
Cf. NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 158-64 (noting that Plato attempts a
322.
similar move in the Republic to (partly) move people beyond the merely human point of
view on value).

323.
See, e.g., Modirzadeh, supra note 319, at 193-94 (discussing the
inconsistency between Islamic law as currently applied and human rights norms).
324.

Cf. JOHN M. HEADLEY, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WORLD: ON THE

ORIGINS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (2008) (discussing the rise of the notion of
humanity as a "single moral collectivity" among the religious class and how the idea
spread to a wider, more secular audience during the Renaissance).
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structure which suggested that Colonialization was a good idea in the
first place. As critiques of international law have long pointed out,
international law as "Gentle Civilizer of Nations" is deeply morally
suspect given the atrocities committed in its name.325
Transnational legal process avoids this problem by avoiding to
cast people as "individuals."3 26 Individualism suggests that it is
possible to meaningfully remove people from their immediate social
context to determine the justice or injustice of their respective social
situation. 327 This is the guiding premise of Kantian rationalism and
influential modern political theory based upon it-most notably John
Rawls'
Theory of Justice and
Ronald
Dworkin's
legal
constructivism. 328 By rejecting this premise, transnational legal
process takes social attachments seriously. 329 People form part of
networks-religious communities, peoples, linguistic communities,
regions, and states. 33 0 These value structures are not static but, as
the transnational legal process itself demonstrates, dynamic. 331
Rather than deeming social practices per se invalid as irrational, the
transnational legal process takes a longer view.3 32 It confronts these
social practices with different interactions, different alternative
interpretations of the overall social fabric of which they form part,
and thus would bring about internalization of new norms in the
context of the old.3 3 3

325.
See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 146-47 (2001).

326.

See

H.

H.

Koh,

Transnational Legal

Process Illuminated,

in

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 327, 328 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002) [hereinafter TLP

Illuminated] (placing participants in the process in the context of their relevant
interpretive communities).
327.

See THOMAS POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: HIS LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE 185-89

(2007) (discussing the rational individualistic underpinnings of Rawls' neo-Kantian
theory of justice).
328.
On the link between Rawls, Dworkin and Kant, see VICTOR SEIDLER, KANT,
RESPECT AND INJUSTICE: THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL MORAL THEORY 128-32 (2010).

329.
See TLP Illuminated, supranote 326, at 328 (quoted above).
330.
See id. at 331-32 (highlighting the importance of governmental
communities); Koh, After 9/11, supra note 316, at 339 (highlighting the importance of
religious communities in people's internalization of moral codes); Janet Koven Levit, A
Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance
Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 188-89 (2005) (discussing the importance of
networks to transnational legal process theory).
See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 184.
331.
332.
See id.
333. It is in this sense that "reason" can critique social processes while also
remaining anchored in the very same process it critiques. See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra
note 41, at xxviii (noting that a theory premised in a holistic process of self-appraisal
"protects our judgments against becoming the dupe of self-interested rationalization;
and it extends our thought into areas that we may not have explored or experienced").
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This subtle positioning of people in society is consistent with
linguistic structures more generally. 334 Language provides communal
structures within which a person acts. In this context, a person will
feel as if he or she records private, individual experiences.3 35 But this
is an illusion because the private experience is reflected in the
superstructure prepared by a social practice: language itself. 336
Thought, speech, and writing are always anchored in a social practice
from which they simply cannot be divorced. 337
Language still remains a tool for personal inquiry and critique.
By engaging in a linguistic practice, participants "make room" for
their contribution.33 8 But this contribution only "makes sense" if it
uses the techniques accepted within the discourse in which it
participates.3 39 Contribution is "interpretation" of an existing set of
rules and cultured experiences.3 40 If this contribution is internalized
by others, the interpretation accepted, the entire social fabric
changes-not just the world of the contributor. 341 Interpretation and
internalization thus cannot step out of existing discourse structures
because statements have meaning only in the context of that
discourse. 342 This structure of discourse means that to take persons
seriously one must take the social context in which they act seriously.
Persons are socialized. 343 But, due to language, their socialization
works in both directions. 344 Persons are not just defined by the

334.
See Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 356 (setting out the private language
argument); Alec Walen, Criticizing the Obligatory Acts of Lawyers: A Response to
Markovits's Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1,
20-21 (2004) (explaining that the point of the private language argument "is this: for S
to be a sign for a private concept, the speaker still has to be able to say what it is a
concept of. But once he starts down that road, he is on the road to using a public
language, full of public concepts").
335.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 361 ("[M]uch must be prepared in
language for the act of naming itself to make sense.").
Id.
336.
Id.
337.
338.
Id. ("For example, when we say that someone names his pain the grammar
of 'pain' prepares the way for that assertion; it shows the place the new word can
inhabit.")
339.
See id. at 363 (noting that a person wishing to give a personal definition
relies on preexisting naming structures).
340.
See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 184 (describing a process of interaction
where new laws emerge, which are interpreted, internalized, and enforced in the
international arena).
341.
See id.
342.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 369.
343.
Cf. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 4 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998) (350 BCE) ("[A]
human being is by nature a political animal .... ).
344.
See id. ("[A] human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any
other gregarious animal [because] no animal has speech except a human being.").
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discourse in which they participate, they actively transform any
discourse in which they themselves act by contributing to it. 345
Transnational legal process thus can hold without selfcontradiction that people are free rather than states or peoples. 3 4 6

But it can also maintain that the lens of the freedom of peoples or the
freedom of states is relevant to determining what the substance of
freedom is.3 47 As any FIFA World Cup demonstrates, people value
belonging to a state and assign value by reference to their national
identity. 348 State freedom less trivially simply is a real factor
affecting the conduct of international affairs and the relationship of
people to international affairs.349 It represents a relevant horizon of
interpretation for that reason alone. 35 0 The same is true with regard
to cultural belonging to ethnic non-state groups. 3 5 ' Because people
hold value structures by means of their internalizations of the social
and political, any conception of freedom similarly must internalize
these commitments.
Mediating between individual, social, and political identities, the
transnational legal process plausibly reflects our every day
experience of freedom. To be free is always to be free in the context of
society. To say "I'm free" makes sense precisely when one's various
social commitments conflict.3 52 There is more than one plausible
action one can take.3 5 3 One must choose between them. 35 4 Being free

does not mean the absence of choice or the presence of arbitrary will.
Rather, it describes a state of being in society affecting one's ability to
choose and act in society. For a person to be free, the transnational
legal process would posit, society has to allow one to act and take
seriously the ethical dilemmas that any of one's more important
choices can entail.
The transnational legal process reconciles the apparently
disparate arguments about who is free in transnational law, states,

345.
See Koh, Obey, supra note 14, at 2646.
346.
Shaffer, Process, supra note 14, at 246-47.
347.
See supra Parts III.A & III.B.
348.
See Philip Oltermann, German World Cup Winners Welcomed Home by
Hundreds of Thousands, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com
football/2014/jul/15/germany-world-cup-winners-return-home (last visited July 15, 2014)
(reporting that half a million people greeted the World Cup-winning German football
team upon the team's return to Berlin).
349.
See TLP Illuminated, supra note 326, at 331-32 (discussing the importance
of government officials in transnational law).
350.
See id.
351.
See id.
352.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 79-82 (discussing deliberation in
the context of incommensurable values in the context of Tiresias' advice in Sophocles'
Antigone).
353.
See id.
354.
See id.
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peoples, or people, by placing the problem in a different light.3 5 5 It

'

posits that the transnational legal process is about personal
freedom. 356 But it takes a meaningfully different view of what it
means to be an individual.35 7 Rather than setting up the individual in
juxtaposition to his or her social context, as enlightenment
individualism so frequently does,3 58 the transnational legal process
conceives of people as acting in, and defined by, the communities to
which they belong.35 9 A person is not an atomistic "individual" coming
into the world as a blank slate. 360 A person is of necessity a
participant in a rich web of processes he or she was born and
socialized into-and a person could not meaningfully choose to opt out
of the process as even that choice would be made in the terms and
against the background of these very processes in question.36
Transnational legal process passes the first hurdle-it has a
cogent theory of who is free. It is ultimately a theory of personal
freedom. It thus can balance arguments about freedom in the
Ukrainian crisis not because it lacks value but because it internalizes
the incommensurable attachments people in society have to the
various groups to which they belong. So far, process thus is resilient
to critique that it has engaged merely in evasion of an ultimately
political conclusion. And it has done so by embracing at its core the
social nature of human beings as constitutive of any legally
meaningful definition of freedom. Having determined who is free,
thus clears the way for the final question: what is the value of
freedom in transnational legal process scholarship? Or, more directly,
what is freedom in transnational law?

IV. WHICH FREEDOM: PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, OR DIGNITY?

Contemporary political theory sets up a dichotomy between
negative freedom and positive freedom. 362 Negative freedom means

355.
356.
357.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.

358.

See ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 62 (3d ed. 2013).

359.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 5 (setting up the same distinction
between Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy and Ancient Greek philosophy).
360.

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 51

(T. Tedgg & Son 1836) (1689) ("Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say white
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas . . . .").
361.
See Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 361.
362.
See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in ConstitutionalLaw, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183, 207 (2011) (discussing the concept of dignity and its connection to
negative freedom); Peter Westen, 'Freedom'and 'Coercion'- Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 550 (1985).
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that a person either could be free from the state or from others;3 63
this conception of freedom sets up a zone of protected privacy.3 64
Alternatively, under positive freedom, a person could be free to
achieve goals, typically with the help of others;366 this conception of
freedom sets up a commonwealth that governs itself in accordance
with the conception of freedom-or literally in accordance with the
principle of auto-nomos (self-rule) or autonomy. 36 6
As the Ukrainian crisis shows, transnational legal arguments
about freedom invoke both conceptions at the same time. Both the
United States and Russia rely upon negative freedom when they
accuse each other of inappropriately interfering in Ukrainian internal
affairs, thus premising their arguments in the negative freedom of
the state.36 7 Both the United States and Russia rely upon negative
freedom when they accuse each other of violent and arbitrary
oppression of political dissidents, thus premising their arguments in
the negative freedom of the individual.36 8
At the same time, Russia relies upon the positive-freedomregarding right of areas with majority ethnic Russian populations,
such as Crimea, to self-govern (at the exclusion of the rights of
minorities in the areas to continue to belong to the larger territorial
sovereign previously controlling the territory in question). 369
Similarly, the United States relies upon a similar argument to justify
the overthrow of the constitutional government in Kyiv-this
overthrow is legitimate because it reflects the direct will of the people

363.
See Westen, supra note 362, at 550 ("Negative freedom is freedom from; it
is the 'absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities-absence of obstructions
on roads along which a man can decide to walk."' (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)
(quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS IN LIBERTY xxxix (1969)).

364.
See Rao, supra note 362, at 207 ("In America, privacy interests are often
characterized as being a form of negative freedom-freedom from interference by the
government in one's home or over personal decisions.").
365.
See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 508-09 (2004) (discussing the various
overlapping uses of "positive freedom" in legal and philosophical literature).
366.

See 1 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 72 (Christopher Berry Gray

ed., 1999) ("The etymology of 'autonomy' (auto-nomos) indicates its general meaning:
'self-rule."').
367.
See Rubin March 6, 2014 Statement, supra note 207 (quoted in footnote
above); Taylor, supra note 207 (Putin "blamed the West for interference in Ukraine").
368.
See, e.g., State Department January 15, 2014 Testimony, supra note 57
(voicing U.S. support for "the Ukrainian people ... in their struggle for fundamental
human rights and a more accountable government"); Tom Cohen, Is Crimea Gone?
Annexation No Longer the Focus of Ukraine Crisis, CNN (Apr. 1, 2014, 5:40 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/poltics/crimea-explainer/ [http://perma.cc/P97B-GT6C] (archived
Jan. 19, 2015) ("Putin claimed ethnic Russians in Crimea faced oppression and needed
Moscow's protection . . . .").
369.
See, e.g., Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra
note 9 (discussed in Part II.A above).
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to be free, meaning to govern themselves.3 7 0 More to the point, both
sides, the United States and Russia, appear to clash about the
freedom of Ukrainians to decide upon a geopolitical alignment with
the West or with Russia.37 1 This question is quintessentially one of
positive freedom-one concerning the choice of collective identity
rather than individual claims to go against the grain of that
collective. 372
The Ukrainian crisis also shows that these arguments
meaningfully conflict. A negative view of freedom would condemn the
actions of the Russian separatist government in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine to expropriate swaths of property and arrest people of the
wrong political persuasion.3 78 Similarly, a negative view of freedom
would condemn the actions of the new Ukrainian government to issue
arrest warrants for politicians like President Viktor Yanukovych
within days of taking power. 374 But these actions are precisely
defensible under a positive view of freedom-a view of freedom which
has as its goal to create conditions sufficient to allow self-government
by civic society. 375 In short, to negative freedom the individual has
primacy over civil society. 3 7 6 To positive freedom, the reverse is
true. 377

370.
See, e.g., id.; Kerry Statement, supra note 7 (quoted above).
371.
See Editorial Board, Ukraine Faces a Key Decision on Alignment with
Europe, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ukrainefaces-a-key-decision-on-alignment-with-europe/20 13/11/12/075d36f4-470d- 11e3-bfOccebf37c6f484_story.html [http://perma.cc/89QM-TUM3] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
372.
See Hill, supra note 365, at 508-09; Westen, supra note 362, at 550
(asserting that positive freedom "is not freedom from, but freedom to"); Rao, supra note
362, at 207 (describing the conflict between conceptions of dignity and the balance
between individual liberty and social or political goals).
373.
See Expropriations Will Cost Crimea Ports Traffic, LLOYDS LIST (London)
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.lloydslist.com/11/sector/ports-and-logistics/article43870l.ece
(noting the decision of Crimea "to confiscate Ukrainian state infrastructure"); Russia
Plans to Re-Start Expropriated Crimean Wind Farms, EXPROPRIATIONNEWS.COM (May
21, 2014), http://expropriationnews.com/2014/05/21/russia-plans-to-re-start-expropriatedcrimean-wind-farms/ [http://perma.cc/HYE5-3CW8] (archived Jan. 19, 2015) (reporting
on Russian efforts to re-start wind farms in newly-annexed Crimea); John Reed,
Arrests and Disappearances on Rise in Eastern Ukraine, FIN. TIMES (U.K.) (Apr. 23,
2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/61285c88-cafO-11e3-9c6a-00144feabdcO
.html#axzz3SDgeY3UZ (describing a trend of Russian political opponents disappearing
in eastern Ukraine).
374.
See Ralph Ellis & Nick Paton Walsh, Ukraine Issues Arrest Warrant for
Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, CNN (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:04 PM), http://www.cnn
.com/2014/02/24/world/europe/ukraine-politics/_[http://perma.ccYU5W-ZGEU] (archived
Jan. 20, 2015).
See Hill, supra note 365, at 508-09.
375.
376.

See ALI MADANIPOUR, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACES OF THE CITY 160 (2003)

('This is a tension between the primacy of the individual and the primacy of the group,
as manifested in many layers of debate.").
377.
See id.
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Again, the transnational legal process appears to accept facially
contradictory conceptions of freedom; it makes sense of arguments
premised in negative freedom (or freedom as privacy) and in positive
freedom (or freedom as autonomy). How then can the transnational
legal process incorporate both concepts of freedom without becoming
devoid of substance? The answer lies in its conception of the person as
acting in, but also transforming, the community of which he or she
belongs, introduced in the previous Part.
A. Privacy - The Concept of Negative Freedom
Orthodox international law defines freedom negatively.3 78 For a
state to be "free" means that no other state has the right or the
authority to interfere with that state's exercise of sovereignty.8 79 This
orthodox definition of the freedom of states applies similarly in the
human rights context: the state must not interfere with an
individual's basic choices relating to his or her own life.3 80
The importance of a negative conception of freedom for orthodox
international law is unsurprising for both intellectual and pragmatic
reasons. As a matter of intellectual history, the Western political
theory informing the formation and development of international law
predominantly relies upon a negative definition of freedom.381 The
negative definition of freedom is paradigmatic for Hobbesian political
theory. 382 A person is free if he or she is not physically hindered from
applying his or her will. 3 88 Liberal political theory rejected this
narrow scope of Hobbesian freedom, adding to it the requirement that
physical or mental duress not hinder application of will. 384 But liberal

political theory by and large has adopted the definition of freedom as
defending the ability to choose-to apply will-rather than its
positive counterpart of achieving a common purpose.3 85

378.
See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
259, 262 (2004) (noting that sovereignty based on negative freedom "was such a
powerful norm in modern international law because the character of positive
sovereignty had been redefined by the experience of revolution").
379.
Id. On what "interfere" means, that is, which conception of freedom
underlies it, see supra Part III.
380.
See Costas Douzinas, The End(s) of Human Rights, 26 MELB. U. L. REV.
445, 462 (2002) (noting the negative definition of freedom in the human rights context).
381.

See, e.g., DOMENICO LOSURDO, HEGEL AND THE FREEDOM OF MODERNS

272 (2004) (framing "negative freedom" as the "leitmotiv of the Anglo-Saxon tradition").
382.
See SKINNER, HOBBES, supra note 95, at 35 (2008) (noting the negative
terms in which human freedom is defined).
383.
See LEVIATHAN, supra note 87, at 148 ("A [f]ree [m]an, is he . .. which by
his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.").
384.
See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 245-52 (2003)
(discussing the relationship between negative freedom and coercion or duress in
contemporary liberal political theory).
385.
See LOSURDO, supra note 381, at 272 (quoted above).
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The historical roots of liberal thought are particularly easy to
transpose to international law for pragmatic reasons. Pragmatically,
states would have to agree to a common goal-and appropriate means
to achieve this goal-in order to abide by a positive definition of
freedom. 386 There would need to be an agreement ex ante what
"international civic society" is about.3 87 Pragmatically, there simply is
no such agreement;3 8 8 a negative definition of freedom is far more in
keeping with the day-to-day experience of many participants in the
transnational legal process.389 This day-to-day experience is that
individuals and states alike make claims that they have a right to
privacy. In the context of constitutional jurisprudence to which
participants in the transnational legal process would be accustomed
from their own domestic law experience, negative freedom-freedom
from-presumes a sphere in which an individual has complete
authority.3 90 It is a place from which a person may exclude others.3 9
This sphere in which a person has such complete authority typically
is his or her home, his or her body. 39 2 Claims to, and discussion of,
such "privacy" are at the forefront of much of the current American

386.
387.
388.

See Kahn, supra note 378, at 272-73.
See id.
See ROBERT W. McELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE

ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 17 (2014) (explaining that divergence of

interests leads to divergence on the view of the goals of international society).
389.
See id. at 17-18 (arguing that nations in the international system are
unwilling to act upon the principle "that the good of the whole ... should take
precedence over the good of the individual nation").
390.
See Evelyn Keyes, The Just Society and the Liberal State: Classical and
Contemporary Liberalism and the Problem of Consent, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 56
(2011) ("[Rjespect for negative liberty requires that 'a frontier must be drawn between
the area of private life and that of public authority,' creating a zone of privacy, or area
of personal moral liberty secured against governmental intrusion." (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
391.
See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1261-65
(2012) (discussing the right to exclude in the context of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).

392.
See id. at 1265 ("The right to exclude others is the strongest when officials
search the home or body and weaker when the government searches property
voluntarily and ordinarily exposed to the public."); see also Rebecca Rausch, Reframing
Roe: Property over Privacy, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 28, 58-62 (2012)
(proposing a similar frame of reference in the context of constitutional protections
regarding abortions).
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debate about political freedoms in civil rights.39 3 It similarly informs
the human rights discourse. 394
This understanding of freedom as privacy is included in a strong
definition of sovereignty.39 5 Such a theory prescribes that sovereigns
have ultimate-that is, unchallengeable-authority against all
outsiders.3 9 6 This theory directly transposes the privacy concern from
the individual sphere to the state-to-state sphere.
The Ukrainian crisis is replete with such arguments about
privacy both on the state-to-state and individual level. Russia thus
casts the support by Western leaders of the Ukrainian revolution as
an "invasion of privacy" of Ukraine.3 97 The United States on the other
hand raises similar arguments with regard to the annexation of
Crimea by Russia for the ostensible purpose of protecting the local
ethnic Russian population. 398 Both look to privacy invasions of
individuals as further support for their respective legal cases.3 99
Given the importance of the negative conception of freedom of
international law, the transnational legal process must internalize
arguments premised upon it.4 00 Transnational legal process scholars
in fact appear to have internalized, or permit internalization of, such
negative freedom norms. 40 1 But problematically, the negative concept
of freedom is deeply at odds with the core theoretical commitment of
transnational legal *process. Transnational legal process works

393.
See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1431 (1992) (discussing privacy in America in the context of the Hardwick case);
Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955, 1011
(2012) (arguing to move away from a purely negative conception of freedom in the
context of gay rights).
394.
Mart Susi, Delfi AS v. Estonia, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 301 (2014)
(discussing the right to privacy in the context of a recent European Court of Human
Rights judgment).
395.
See Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the
International Criminal Court and the Commitment to InternationalLaw, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 337, 339 & n.6 (1999) (discussing Henkin's criticism of privacy-based strong
sovereignty).
396.
See generally Fr6dric Gilles Sourgens, Positivism, Humanism, and
Hegemony: Sovereignty and Security for Our Time, 25 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 433
(2006) (discussing the historical development of sovereignty in international law).
397.
See Taylor, supra note 207.
398.
See Rubin March 6, 2014 Statement, supra note 207 (outlining the U.S.'s
belief in protecting the sovereignty of Ukraine).
399.
See id. (emphasizing that "the democratic transition that occurred in
Ukraine was an expression of will of the Ukrainian people"); Taylor, supra note 207
(explaining Russia's resistance to the West as arising out of a desire to insulate the
people of Russia and Ukraine from outside interference).
400.
Failure to do so would simply make the transnational legal process
substantively untenable. See Kahn, supra note 378, at 262.
401.
See Oona Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1840
(2003) (discussing negative liberty); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of
New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 61, 135 (2009) (discussing negative liberty).
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through process participation. 4 2 A negative view of freedom would
precisely stipulate that freedom means the absence of process-that
is, the right to be free from the transnational legal obligations process
itself entails.40 s
This problem is not trivial. 404 Transnational legal process
assumes and requires that it can ascribe meaning to any problem. 40 5
The question is how the transnational legal process would internalize
the current situation into an existing web of past cultured
experience.4 0 6 Internalization requires a comparison of the current
problem to past instances of process application.4 0 7 This in turn
means that there is no factual areas that are a priori beyond the
reach of transnational legal process-process reaches as far as our
experience and our imagination can proceed.40 8
Worse still, the point of process theory is that even the decision
to opt out of process only makes sense through the lens of process
itself.4 09 In the same way that there is no fully private language
because all language relies upon a prefabricated social grammar,
there is no fully private space because the conception of this "space"
relies upon a prefabricated social grammar as well. 410 Process
precisely means, as Wittgenstein would suggest, the absence of
privacy and thus the rejection of negative freedom.411

402. Harold Hongju Koh reinterprets sovereignty as representing "a nation's
capacity to participate in international affairs." Harold Hongju Koh, On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) [hereinafter Koh, Exceptionalism]
(footnote omitted).
See Keyes, supra note 390, at 56.
403.

404.

See Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14

HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 823, 829-30 (1991) (defining trivial cases as those in which
"nothing of much importance is at stake" either "because nothing of much moral
importance to the judge is stake" (morally trivial) or "no one will lose a lot of money, be
incarcerated for a long time, or have her life strongly affected in some other way"
(consequentially trivial)).
Compare Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 207, with NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra
405.
note 41, at 70 (noting the open-endedness of complexity).
See, e.g., Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 203-06 (discussing interaction and
406.
internalization in the transnational legal process).
407.
See id.; see also NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 69 (characterizing the
process of interpretation as "burrowing with horizontal drawing of connections").

408.

See, e.g., Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55

STAN. L. REV. 2091, 2106 (2003). Ward writes:
Perhaps the most compelling account of a such [sic] a 'process' is captured in
William Twining's suggestion that there must be a 'remapping' of law. What we
need, according to Twining, is a map that properly 'emphasizes the
complexities and elusiveness of reality, the difficulties of grasping it, and the
value of imagination and multiple perspectives in facing these difficulties.'
Id. (quoting WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 49, 243 (2000)).

409.
410.
411.

See supra Part III.C.
Wittgenstein, supra note 134, at 356.
Id.
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The inclusion of negative freedom in the vocabulary of the
transnational legal process poses a puzzle. Negative freedom appears
inconsistent with the process' premise. There is no privacy in process.
A theoretical account of freedom therefore will have to
reconceptualize and explain how traditional negative conceptions of
freedom can be reconciled with the process perspective-or risk
devolving into an arbitrary justification for politically predetermined
results.
B. Autonomy - The Concept of Positive Freedom
Transnational legal process at first blush appears far more
compatible with a positive definition of freedom. 41 2 Positive freedom
is about the ability to achieve goals. 4 13 The person who is free is free
because he or she can overcome contingency and fortune. 41 4 Of
course, to respond to contingency or fortune, to escape a state of
nature, requires more than just one person-it requires the
participation of those daring to be free in a political community.4 15
Recent scholarship submits that John Locke defended a positive
definition of freedom within the liberal tradition:
Rather than being a supporter of negative liberty in the Hobbesian
sense, Locke was working from a conception of freedom that focuses on
the positive aspects of what the law can accomplish. According to
Locke, just laws do not restrict freedom. For example, Locke referred to
people's beliefs about virtue and vice in a given community as a "law of
opinion" since there were reputational sanctions for deviating from it. If
opinions about virtue and vice in a given community are sound, the
freedom of people is not restricted. Locke's position was that legitimate
416
law does not restrict but rather increases the freedom of the subject.

See Koh, Exceptionalism, supra note 402, at 1480 (quoting Margaret
412.
MacMillan describing the "two sides" of American exceptionalism: "the one eager to set
the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message should
be ignored" (PEACEMAKERS: THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS ATTEMPT TO END

WAR 22 (2001))).
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property'sEnds: The Publicness of Private
413.
Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1269 (2014) ("[A] person is not truly free until his
desires, plans, and goals are stabilized so that there is continuity between the plans
and actions of his past and those of his future.").
See id. ("The person who acts on the basis of whim, who flits from one
414.
impulse to another, is not truly free but instead is a hostage to such unstable urges.
Such a person has no real sense of enduring identity. Even his moral agency is subject
to doubt.").
See Hill, supra note 365, at 510 (noting the link between
415.
communitarianism and positive liberty); on the "daring" to be free meme, see, for
example, POCOCK, supra note 41, at 193 (linking the concepts of civic virtue, daring,
and fortune in Renaissance civic humanism).
416.

ALEX TUCKNESS, LOCKE AND THE LEGISLATIVE POINT OF VIEW: TOLERATION,

CONTESTED PRINCIPLES, AND THE LAW 105 (2002) (citations omitted). But see, e.g.,
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969)
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The transnational legal process has significant points of overlap
with such a positive conception of freedom for at least two reasons.
First of all, the transnational legal process is expressly normative. 4 17
The transnational legal process does not export norm creation to
some parliamentarian body or majority rule. 418 It has no political
constitution. 419 Instead, process results generate norms precisely
because these results came out of the process. 420 Process creates
norms and strives towards ends independently of any other
constitutional structure.
Process legitimacy therefore crucially depends upon the ultimate
ends it serves because it cannot point to any other external point of
reference that would lend it additional legitimacy. 421 Process
4 22
legitimacy, dauntingly, is entirely internal to the process itself.

Legitimacy appears to depend upon the simple question: do more
process norms make process participants freer? This question is
almost nonsensical from the point of view of negative freedom-more
norms precisely equal less freedom as talking heads so frequently
remind us. 423 The question makes sense-and arguably only makes
sense-from the vantage point of positive freedom. 424
(placing Locke in the camp of negative liberty); John Inglis, Freiheit, Liberti, or Free
Choice: The Recovery of Aquinas After 1848 as Interpretationor Misinterpretation?, in
AQUINAS AS AUTHORITY 109, 116 (Paul van Geest et al. eds., 2002) (noting a correlative
negative definition of freedom in Lockean thought). The project of freedom as mastery
over contingency or fortune certainly predates the liberal tradition. Cf. QUENTIN
SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998) (outlining the rich history of freedom

before the liberal era). Stabilizing the "wheel of fortune" through constitutional design
is one of the key themes of Renaissance political theory-a theme more familiar to
modern readers as the mastery of market and political cycles. Compare, e.g., POCOCK,
supra note 41, at 197-218, with DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 51-55 (Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow trans., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1886) (describing the
wheel of fortune in canto vii of hell). It is a central element of Plato's ethical project,
too-and a problem central to the entirety of Greek literature in the broadest sense.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41 passim.
417.
See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 184 ("From this process of interaction, new
rules of law emerge, which are interpreted, internalized, and enforced, thus beginning
the process all over again.").
418.
See id. ("Transnational law transforms, mutates, and percolates up and
down, from the public to the private, from the domestic to the international level and
back down again.").
419.
See id. (describing the transnational legal process as "dynamic, not static").
420.
See id. (explaining that "international interaction among transnational
actors shapes law" and that "law shapes and guides future interactions").
421.
See, e.g., Waters, Normativity, supra note 27, at 465-67 (2007) (noting the
countermajoritarian problems of the transnational legal process).
422.
See id.
423.
See, e.g., Steve Forbes et al., Will New Regulations Spike Consumers'
Energy Costs?, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/cost-of-freedom/
2014/02/17/will-new-regulations-spike-consumers-energy-costs [httpJ/perma.ccJ2L6-CKXP]
(archived Feb. 14, 2015) ("Steve Forbes: It shouldn't be a bureaucrat deciding what
energy you use. Let the free markets work. Free markets are free people.... It's
freedom.").
424.
See TUCKNESS, supra note 416, at 105.
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Second of all, the transnational legal process has an independent
ultimate end consistent with the positive freedom project. It, too,
seeks to place its domain of application beyond the scope of
contingency, whim, or fortune.4 2 5 It seeks to place its domain of
application under law, that is, the paragon of order. 426 In this sense,
the transnational legal process in every sense of the word seeks to
"domesticate" the apparently wild frontier of all cross-border
transactions be they between states, multinational corporations, and
individuals. 427 It precisely appears to take up the mantle of
Renaissance theorists seeking to halt or slow political and market
cycles by legal innovation.4 28 Transnational legal process is about the
sustainable self-governance of the international community under
law and thus about the banishment-as far as possible-of
contingency, whim, or fortune from commanding the international
scene.
Again the current arguments traded between the United States
and Russia demonstrate how a positive conception of freedom works
within the transnational legal process. Thus, the Russian arguments
for self-determination of the ethnic Russian population in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine rely upon a positive conception of freedom: the
freedom of ethnic groups to govern themselves. 429 Similarly, the
United States' view that popular will can unseat a constitutional
government that has suppressed political freedoms similarly draws
upon positive rather than negative ideas of freedom. 430 These
arguments are about an international community governed under law
(as opposed to brute force). 4 31 They are arguments that go to the
heart of what process participants think the process should be about
in the first place-sustainable self-governance.
Problematically, the clear theoretical preference for a positive,
participation-based conception of freedom in the transnational legal
process runs headlong into the acceptance of negative freedom-based

425 See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 183 ("That question -- why nations obey -centrally challenges scholars of both international law and international relations.").
426.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Generalityof Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217,
233-34 (2004) (noting the distinctiveness of law as stability).
427.
It both tames and internalizes these transactions by placing them within a
legal structure. See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 183-84.
428.
See POCOCK, supra note 41, at 317-18 (discussing the importance of cycles
for Renaissance political thought).
429.
See, e.g., Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra
note 9 ("[U]nilateral announcement of independence by a part of a state does not
violate any provision of international law.").
See Kerry Statement, supra note 7.
430.
431.
Cf. Christian Marxsen, Crimea's Declarationof Independence, EJIL:TALK!
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-declaration-of-independence/ [http://perma.cc/
F7PR-A69S] (archived Feb. 19, 2015).
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arguments within the transnational legal process. 432 Because of its
focus on the attainment of some ultimate good, the positive freedom
project competes with the negative project. 43 Positive freedom
requires cooperation, participation, and coordination of civic society to
achieve the good it seeks to attain. 434 Opting out by reference to a
privacy right to believe in a different ethical ultimate good precisely
would undermine this civic good. 435 It therefore cannot be allowed to
4 36
Civic
stand-it reintroduces fortune and all of its entropic might.

virtue and personal liberty for this reason traditionally have been
cast to be at odds with each other. 4 37
Perhaps even more problematically, a positive conception of
freedom again appears to impose a full-blooded conception of what
"good" is. 438 Plainly, the arguments relating to current events in
Ukraine suggest that both the United States and Russia have very
different ideas of what is good. 439 To say that one is right and one is
wrong would suggest that the transnational legal process plays
favorites-it imposes a norm rather than simply relying on the norms
already present in process participants. The arguments of both the
United States and Russia plainly make sense in the context of
transnational law-they are interpretations of current events in light
of recognized instances of past transnational legal problem
solutions.44 0 To say that one problem solution is better than the other
because of an outside value or good would tend to undermine the idea
of going through a process approach in the first place. 44 1 One
approach could simply claim that the other position is deductively
wrong because there is in fact a normative first principle to which one
44 2
side is faithful and the other side is not.

The answer to this problem must be that the good in question is
not external to the transnational legal process but internal to it. It

432.
See supra Part W.A.
433.
See Berlin, supra note 416, at 131-34.
434.
See Linda R. Hirshman, The Rape of the Locke: Race, Gender, and the Loss
of Liberal Virtue, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1159 & n.165 (1992) ("Public or political
liberty-or what we now call positive liberty-meant participation in government.").
See supra Part W.A.
435.
436.
See POCOCK, supra note 41, at 98 (discussing the particular danger of decay
of civic community in Renaissance Florentine thought).
See, e.g., Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, in STANFORD
437.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 5, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/libertypositive-negativel [http://perma.cc/H6BV-KEKM] (archived Feb. 14, 2015).
438.
See Berlin, supra note 416, at 145-54 (articulating the process by which a
positive freedom theory concludes that there is one truth or solution to the problem of
injustice).
439.
Compare Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crimea Statement, supra
note 9, with Kerry Statement, supra note 7.
See supra Part II.
440.
441.
See supra Part II.
442.
See supra Part II.
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must be a condition for participation in the process to make sense, at
all. This task is made the more complicated because the transnational
legal process fully admits the incommensurable plurality of values in
international law.4 48 There is no common denominator of the "virtue
of international law" but multiple competing and incommensurable
virtues. 444 The clearly apparent preference for a positive
interpretation of freedom therefore has to square the circle: how to
make freedom positive without supplying an ultimate substantive
goal or end solution toward which the transnational legal process
would drive transnational law?
C. Dignity - The Concept of Civic Freedom
Classical thought provides a potential solution for the value
problem experienced by the transnational legal process. A core
tradition in classical thought conceives of freedom not in terms of the
dichotomy of positive and negative freedom. 445 Rather, the positive
and negative facets of liberal freedom are internalized in the concept
of human dignity. 446 This conception of freedom as dignity became
central to the Renaissance humanist rediscovery of antiquity.4 4 7

443.
See supra Part II.
444.
See supra Part II.
445.
See, e.g., VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE OTHER GREEKS: THE FAMILY FARM
AND THE AGRARIAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 43 (1999) ("After all, farmers
themselves knew the value of banding together to preserve their own hard-won gains
against the wealthy in a no-nonsense pragmatism that in every early timocratic
agricultural city-state checked radicalism and, eventually, the excesses of both
aristocracy and democracy.").
446.
See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 38 (2007) (discussing the
Stoic roots of dignity in the natural law tradition).
447.
See GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, DE HOMINIs DIGNITATE 9-10 (Gerd
von Gbnna ed., 1997) (1496) (identifying the capacity to choose-freedom-as the core
element of human dignity); see also POCOCK, supra note 41, at 98-99 (discussing the
work). While this conception of dignity has significant overlap with the deontological
Kantian and neo-Kantian view of dignity, it is not a perfect analogue for it. For a
discussion of the neo-Kantian view of dignity requiring in broad outlines that persons
be treated as ends in themselves rather than as means to an end see, for example,
Edward M. Andries, On The German Constitution's Fiftieth Anniversary: Jacques
Maritainand the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 20-22, 4358 (1999) (contrasting a Christian natural rights perspective with a neo-Kantian
perspective of dignity in the context of the German Basic Law); J.M. Finnis, Legal
Enforcement of 'Duties to Oneself"- Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 43946 (1987) (providing a natural critique of Kantian and neo-Kantian dignity); Rex
Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 88-89 (2011)
(discussing the neo-Kantian view of human dignity in the context of United States
constitutional jurisprudence). The perhaps key distinction between a Kantian view of
dignity and the view of dignity which follows is one of perspective. What follows
submits that human dignity is in fact a means to an end-the self-propagation of legal
process-rather than simply an end itself. The position that dignity refers to treating a

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

530

[VOL. 48:471

Dignity in classical thought responds to a problem that greatly
resembles the problem experienced by the transnational legal
process. As Martha Nussbaum's Fragility of Goodness explores,
classic Athenian tragedy reflects the struggle between civic virtue
and human social attachments in the Athenian golden age. 448
Sophoclean tragedy in particular highlights that social values remain
fundamentally incommensurable-and that any attempt to tame this
incommensurability through political power ends in failure and tragic
450
it Must
loss. 44 9 Tragic conflict, in other words, cannot be avoided;

be addressed. Rather than rely upon a single measure of the social
good, Nussbaum proposes that classical Athenian thought offers
yielding deliberation as a means to addressing tragic conflict. 451 This
yielding deliberation requires an acknowledgement of the difference
in others and their right to being different. 45 2 It then requires "the
preservation of the mystery and specialness of the external, the
preservation, in one oneself, of the passion that take one to these
mysteries. Such a life has room for love; and it also has room, as
Tiresias's life shows, for genuine community and cooperation." 453
The constituent parts of yielding deliberation form the seed of
the conception of human dignity. 45 4 This discourse of dignity had
deep political roots. It originated from the "yeoman ideology" in
Athenian democracy which "impl[ied] 'that the basis for social change
was deeply rooted in a firm sense of identity and self-esteem of the
peasant class, and, further, that a feeling for justice, equality and
common dignity formed a stratum of democratic orientation which
found constant public expression during the seventh and sixth
centuries"' BCE. 455
person as an end in him or herself and the position that dignity is the means to
achieving societal ends are certainly not mutually exclusive. They are, however,
intuitively juxtaposed. As the conclusion will show, what the instrumentalization of
dignity tends to show is that both views of dignity-the view of dignity as the ultimate
right and the view of dignity as the ultimate means-ultimately support each other.
448.

See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 61 ("Creon's plan does not

permit him to respect a human opponent because of the value of that person's
humanity. He or she contains only a single value, productive of civic good; lacking that,
she is 'nowhere."'). Although FOG does not cast the problem in terms of dignity,
Martha Nussbaum's preface to the updated edition links FOG to the concept of Stoic
dignity. See id. at xx.
449.
See id. at 78 (discussing the impossibility to harmonize various conceptions
of the good in Antigone).
450.
See id.
See id. at 79 ("Tiresias says that good deliberation is connected with
451.
'yielding,' with renouncing self-willed stubbornness, with being flexible." (citations
omitted)).
452.
See id.
453.
Id. at 81.
454.
See id. at xx (discussing the link of Fragilityto Stoic dignity).
455.
See HANSON, supra note 445, at 205-06 (footnote omitted) (quoting Walter
22
Donlan,
The Tradition of Anti-Aristocratic Thought in Early Greek Poetry,
HISTORIA 145, 154 (1973)).
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Dignity in ancient Greek and Roman thought was thoroughly
social. 4 56 It was premised upon participation-and the manner in
which to respond to the participation of others. 45 7 Dignity required
yielding to, respecting, or taking seriously the contribution of
others. 4 58 In this sense "dignity" came to describe a duty one owed to
others. 4 59 But like the transnational legal process, classical thought
was not individualistic in the enlightenment sense as its view of
dignity suggests-a view which is prima facie puzzling from an
individualist enlightenment perspective. 460 On the one hand,
consistent with individualism, Stoic thought considered that all
human beings had "the same quantum of dignity by virtue of [their]
humanity." 461 On the other hand, particularly Roman tradition
ascribed greater dignity to holders of high office. 462 How could the
same person be equal and more than equal? How could dignity both
not take into account and depend upon social station?
Dignity as yielding suggests a common sense solution. Dignity
requires in the first instance that one yields to, respects, and takes
seriously the contributions of all discourse participants. 463 It is a duty
strongly resembling the requirement of good faith exercise of

456.
See, e.g., HORST HUTTER, POLITICS AS FRIENDSHIP: THE ORIGINS OF
CLASSICAL NOTIONS OF POLITICS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FRIENDSHIP 35

(1978) (linking dignity to customary norms subject to powerful social sanction); J. E.
Lendon, Roman Honor, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE

ROMAN WORLD 377, 379 (Michael Peachin ed., 2011) (linking dignity to revenge and
honor).
457.
See, e.g., Joy Connolly, Rhetorical Education, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL RELATIONS, supra note 456, at 101-02 (linking dignity to eloquence in public
deliberation by reference to Cicero's De Oratore).
458.
See, e.g., Hebert Spiegelberg, Human Dignity:A Challenge to Contemporary
&

Philosophy, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THIS CENTURY AND THE NEXT 39, 58 (Rubin Gotesky

Ervin Laszlo eds., 1970) (discussing the distinction between toleration and deliberation
in the context of dignity).
459.

See, e.g., A.A. LONG, EPICTETUS: A STOIC AND SOCRATIC GUIDE TO LIFE 237

(2002) ("The correct performance of one's social roles-Epictetus' second topic-is both
outwardly and inwardly oriented. It is outward in what it requires by way of sensitivity
to the dignity and claims of other persons, but what it is about other persons that
should concern us is not how they treat us, . . . but only how we dispose ourselves in
relation to them.").
460.
Kurt Bayertz, Human Dignity: Philosophical Origin and Scientific Erosion
of an Idea, in SANCTITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 73, 73 (Kurt Bayertz ed., 1996)

(noting that Cicero used inconsistent interpretations of dignity in his writings "side by
side").
461.
Rao, supra note 362, at 201.
462.
The Latin typically here should be gravitas rather than dignitas. Gravitas
refers to the "dignified authority" of its holder. See Sarah Culpepper Stroup, Greek
Rhetoric Meets Rome: Expansion, Resistance, and Acculturation, in A COMPANION TO
ROMAN RHETORIC 23, 27 (William Dominik & Jon Hall eds., 2010). On the relationship
between rank and dignity, see generally Jeremy Waldron, Lecture 1: Dignity and Rank,
in DIGNITY, RANK, & RIGHTS 13, (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012).
463.
See, e.g., Spiegelberg, supra note 458, at 58 (discussing the relationship
between respect and dignity).
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discretion in the United States common law of contracts. 464 This
resemblance is most apparent in the context of a well-known textbook
example of good faith, Locke v. Warner Bros. Inc. 465 Locke involved a
messy Hollywood relationship involving Warner Brothers; Sondra
Locke, an actress and movie director; and her love interest, Clint
Eastwood. 466 After some thirteen years of romantic entanglement,
Eastwood "terminated" the relationship and Locke sued. 467 Locke

asserted that as part of the settlement agreement, "Eastwood secured
a development deal for Locke with Warner in exchange for Locke's
dropping her case against him." 4 68 The agreement provided that
"Locke would receive $250,000 per year for three years for a 'nonexclusive first look deal"' requiring Locke "to submit to Warner any
picture she was interested in developing before submitting it to any
other studio" for a thirty-day period in which Warner could
"either . . . approve or reject a submission." 469 If the project was
approved, the contract provided for "a $750,000 'pay or play' directing
deal ... giv[ing] the studio [the] choice . .. either [to] 'play' the
director by using the director's services, or pay the director his or her
fee." 470 Eastwood apparently reimbursed Warner Brothers for its
fixed expenses and, Locke alleged, instructed Warner Brothers not to
accept any of Locke's submissions. 4 71 After Warner Brothers rejected
project after project, Locke sued Warner Brothers. 472
The Locke court on appeal rejected Warner Brothers' defense
that Locke lacked a cause of action because Warner Brothers had
complete discretion to accept or reject her proposals, reasoning:
[W]hen it is a condition of an obligor's duty that he or she be
subjectively satisfied with respect to the obligee's performance, the
subjective standard of honest satisfaction is applicable. . . . Therefore,
the trial court erred in deferring entirely to what it characterized as
Warner's "creative decision" in the handling of the development deal. If
Warner acted in bad faith by categorically rejecting Locke's work and
refusing to work with her, irrespective of the merits of her proposals,
such conduct is not beyond the reach of the law. 4 7 3

464.
See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 689, 706 (2013) (discussing discretion and good faith).
465.
See generally Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Ct. App.
1997) (interpreting the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing); c.f.
DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 518 (3d ed. 2011) (using the case in the
context of good faith in contract law).
466.
See Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-23.
See id. at 921-22.
467.
468.
Id. at 922.
469.
Id.
470.
Id.
See id.
471.
472.
See id. at 922-23.
473.
Id. at 925-26 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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Applied to the question of dignity, such good faith requires that
one consider "the merits of [the] proposals" of others in civic
discourse.4 74 Proposals cannot be rejected out of hand because the
proposals work an inconvenience that has nothing to do with the
proposals themselves, that is, Eastwood could get upset at Warner
Brothers for producing a Locke movie. 4 75 Or, in the context of
Athenian tragedy examined by Nussbaum, Creon cannot reject
Antigone's appeal to family values because in that particular instance
the interest of family would create a civic inconvenience. 4 76 Dignity
requires that one treat the proposals of others as presumptively valid
contributions, the merits of which must be grappled with seriously
and honestly. 477 This form of dignity does not mean that one must
ascribe any particular authority to the proposals in question-they
simply have to be honestly assessed.4 78 This is a binary propositionone either does or does not take a contribution seriously-one either
does or does not consider the proposition in good faith. 479
This form of dignity does not exclude that some statements have
greater authority than others-and that their authority is
inextricably intertwined with who makes these statements. 480 For
instance, some speakers by inhabiting elected office do not speak only
for themselves-and as such are entitled to the same serious
consideration as everyone around them-they speak for others as
well. 48 1 They can make authoritative pronouncements in light of the
social function they fulfill. 482 The same is true of holders of religious

office. 4 83 In fact, in many cases, antiquity intermingled religious and

474.

See id.

475.
See id. at 926 (discussing evidence produced by Locke that her proposals
were not even considered at Eastwood's request).
476.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 81.
477.
See Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925 (explaining that the exercise of discretion
must be analyzed against the subjective standard of honest satisfaction); Teri J.
Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith from (Some)
Contracts, 84 OR. L. REV. 227, 248 (2005) (noting that the case required that "the studio
could not simply decide for any reason to reject the proposals and pay the money. It
could do so only if it was dissatisfied with the quality of the proposals.").
478.
See Dobbins, supranote 477, at 248.
479.
See id.
480.
Stroup, supra note 462, at 27 (noting the link of dignity and authority in
the context of "gravitas").
481.

See, e.g., JAKOB AAL OTTESEN LARSEN, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN

GREEK AND ROMAN HISTORY 135 (1976) (discussing the context of gravitas in Roman
government).
482.
See, e.g., Nathan Rosenstein, Aristocratic Values, in A COMPANION TO THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC 365, 372-73 (Nathan Rosenstein & Robert Morstein-Marx eds., 2010)
(explaining the role of gravitas in Roman constitutional theory).
483.
LARSEN, supra note 481, at 135 (discussing the interweaving of religious
and civic office at Rome in the context of gravitas).
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civic office, such as in the case of the tribune of the plebs at Rome. 4 84
This tribune could veto laws on account of both his civic and religious
authority. 485 The tribune further was sacrosanct in his person and an
assault on the tribune was a religious and civic offense against the
dignity of the plebs for whom he spoke. 486 According the tribune
greater "dignity" thus simply ascribes to him a representative
authoritative function that is in no way inconsistent with the general
proposition of equal dignity. 487 One does not yield more to the
tribune, one simply ascribes appropriate authority to his statements
in order appropriately to contextualize them. Dignity as authority
thus incorporates not just the immediately personal, but internalizes
the social dimension of human value attachments in community. It
thus incorporates the value attachments to state and ethnic
community, relevant to the determination of freedom in the
transnational legal process in situating and exploring personal
freedom. 488
Of course, dignity in ancient Greece and Rome was not just a
duty, it also, and perhaps chiefly, described a right.489 As much as one
owed to others to treat them with dignity, a person has that right in
return. 490 Further, one does not seem to relinquish the right to be
treated with dignity simply because one failed to treat others in the
same way. 491 A tit for tat seems almost by definition excluded.
An understanding of such a right implies an ownership interest
in dignity. The "right" or entitlement to dignitas arises out of
ownership-dominium. 492 A right to dignity denotes an ownership of

484.

See JACK J. LENNON, POLLUTION AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ROME 51-52

(2014) (discussing the deeply religious foundations of the tribune's gravitas).
485.
See 3 VICTOR DURuY, HISTORY OF ROME, AND OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE, FROM
ITS ORIGIN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIAN EMPIRE 41-43 (J. P. Mahaffy

ed., 1885) (discussing the comingled religious and civic roots of the Roman constitution).
486.

HENRY THOMPSON ROWELL, ROME IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE 64 (1962) ("The

person of a tribune was sacrosanct; that is, hands could not be laid upon him to
restrain his actions.").
487.
See LENNON, supra note 484, at 51-52 (explaining that a tribune "should
[not] continue working in the law courts during his year of office" because "[a] person
engaged in a sacred or inviolable office required a change in others' behaviour, which
marked him or her out as separate").
488.
See supra Part 11I.C.
489.
Waldron, supra note 462, at 14 ("Dignity is intimately connected with the
idea of rights-as the ground of rights, the content of certain rights, and perhaps even
the form and structure of rights.").
490.
See, e.g., Lendon, supra note 456, at 379 (linking dignity to revenge and
honor); HUTTER, supra note 456, at 35 (linking dignity to customary norms subject to
powerful social sanction).
491.
LONG, supra note 459, at 237 (discussing Epictetus' view on point).
492.

See W. JEFFREY

TATUM,

THE PATRICIAN

TRIBUNE,

PUBLIUS

CLODUS

PULCHER 159 (1999) (noting the link between dignitas, domus and dominium in the
context of the destruction by Clodius of Cicero's house or domus).
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one's humanity. 493 English grammar still reflects this ancient
ownership interest when we say that a person has dignity. Similarly
one is "entitled" to treatment by others with dignity. 494
The classical concerns map directly onto the problem of freedom
in the transnational legal process. Like the transnational legal
process, the problem of Sophoclean tragedy is the absence of a single
civic good to be attained by means of positive freedom.4 95 In fact,
every attempt to provide such a single good precisely creates tragic
conflict. 496 Like the transnational legal process, the Sophoclean
tragedy provides tangible proof why a privacy alternative similarly
does not work-the actions with regard to which privacy would be
invoked (burial of a family member) have deep social and thus civic
meaning.4 9 7 They are not beyond the social process but central to
it.

49

Thus their tragic potential. 499 Not only does the classical

paradigm address a similar problem, it provides a solution that
permits a reconciliation of the positive/negative freedom juxtaposition
plaguing transnational legal process. Yielding deliberation and
dignity ultimately combine three elements: property rights,
participation in deliberation, and permanence or stability of social
institutions. These three elements translate positive and negative
elements of freedom in the liberal debate into a single paradigm.
Most centrally, negative freedom is no longer a matter of
privacy.50 0 The core concern to prevent social encroachment on the
person instead is buttressed by a property rationale. 501 Society may
not encroach because the person has title to and ownership of his or
her own humanity.5 02 Transgression of this line thus is not an

493.
Cf. id. ("The grand mansion was nothing less than the most visible and
tangible symbol of a Roman's high birth and splendor.... Dignitas demanded, and was
enhanced by, ample aedificatio [building].").
494.
See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and PoliticalEntitlements, in
HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL

ON BIOETHICS 351, 362-65, (2008), available at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edul
pcbe/reports/human dignity/chapterl4.html [https://perma.cc/8D4Q-PMAV] (archived
Jan. 20, 2015).
495.
See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to InternationalLaw, 32
YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 309-11 (2007) (noting the pluralist commitments of transnational
legal process scholarship).
496.
See id. at 308.
497.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 55 (discussing the social and
political implication of burials at Athens).
498.

See id.

499.
See id.
500.
See supraPart IV.A.
501.
See, e.g., TATUM, supra note 492, at 159 ("The domus was not merely a
residence for the Roman aristocrat. It defined the space and range of his immediate
household, over whom he exercised potestas or dominium.").
502.
Cf. Nussbaum, Entitlements, supranote 494, at 363.
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invasion of privacy-it is a coercive, even brutal, taking.5 03 Treating a
human being as less than human-as "mere animal"-denigrates or
belittles him or her literally by taking away his or her humanity.5 0 4
Denying that a person lacks an essential (legal) capability essential to
human endeavors on account of a person's identity or chosen values
commits the same vice in a more limited form.
Natural rights theories centrally rely upon this property interest
to define humanity itself. 505 Medieval Christian rights theories
submitted that we have "natural" rights because we have dominion
over our soul. 0 6 These medieval Christian natural rights theories in
turn mimic classical myth structures using the same property-based
imagery such as the Promethean gift of reason and craft to
humanity.50 7
Critically, property rights are not "private." They are and must
be social.5 08 Property rights are defined by their social sanction-just
as dignity is defined by reference to its social sanction.5 09 Rather than
excluding the state, negative freedom in the guise of a property right
precisely relies upon the social mechanism to enforce exclusion.51 0
Privacy thus is not the absence of society or government. Privacy
becomes the ability to claim ownership of oneself against others in
society in terms central to the social process itself.5 1

See John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality:A
503.
Specific Critiqueof Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 101-02 (2010) ('[C]onstitutional
dignity,' whatever it is, stands in contrast to concepts like brutality, degradation, or
other 'uncivilized or barbarous behavior."' (footnote omitted)).
504.
See id.; see also NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 36 (discussing the same
concept in the context of Agamemnon's human sacrifice of his daughter in Aeschylean
tragedy).
505.
PICO, supra note 447, at 8-9 (noting that human dignity derives from God's
gift to Man to choose the gift he or she desires).
506.

See generally RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN

AND DEVELOPMENT (1981) (discussing the ius/dominium dichotomy in medieval and
Renaissance natural rights theories).
507.
VICTOR EHRENBERG, FROM SOLON TO SOCRATES: GREEK HISTORY AND
CIVILIZATION DURING THE 6TH AND 5TH CENTURIES BC 342-43 (2014) (discussing the

Promethean myth in the context of Platonic philosophy and its engagement Sophist
tradition).
508.
This of course is much of the point of entering into a "social contract"-it is
necessary for the protection and enjoyment of "private" property. See, e.g., James Boyle,
Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller'sPublic Jurisprudence of Form, Private
Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 388 (1993) (noting the link
between property, social sanction, and freedom).
See, e.g., Lendon, supra note 456, at 379-83; HUTTER, supranote 456, at 35.
509.
See Boyle, supra note 508, at 388.
510.
511.
Cf. Rausch, supra note 392, at 46-51 (discussing the use of private property
rights to exert control over an individual's body and noting that "the Supreme Court
has recognized the right to exclude in the context of bodily integrity" (footnote
omitted)).

2015]

FUNCTIONS OF FREEDOM

537

Property has another central quality: unlike privacy, it is not
binary.5 1 2 Ownership is frequently referred to as a "bundle of sticks"
and could be referred to by other forms of synthesis. 5 13 This makes it
possible to oppose various claims to property rights to each otherthat is, the claim to a "privacy" right to the claim of a civic need to
override or modify it.5 1 4
Similarly, positive freedom is no longer about the attainment of a
single substantive goal.5 15 Freedom instead is about participation in
civic discourse and civic self-governance.5 16 Participation is defined
by
reference
to
yielding
to
incommensurability,
an
incommensurability necessitated by the many substantive views of
good held by discourse participants. 517 It requires an acceptance of all
value structures in society as valid rather than replacing all value
structures by reference to single unitary measure of value.5 1 8 As

Nussbaum explains, civic value exists precisely because of the various
value processes making up civil society. 519 Process creates and binds
society because it respects and engages this inherent difference
rather than seeks to supplant it.520
Participation in the process thus is about enriching the social
fabric and including perspectives in it rather than excluding
perspectives. 5 2 ' Participation becomes valuable not because of some
other outside goal but because it is valuable in its own right-because
it enriches its participants and permits them to govern themselves in

512.
See Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party
Privacy Problem, 65 S.C. L. REV. 373, 377 (2013) (discussing binary and non-binary
conceptions of privacy). On the classical binary distinction, see FRIEDRICH KARL VON
SAVIGNY, JuRAL RELATIONS: OR, THE ROMAN LAW OF PERSONS AS SUBJECT OF JURAL

RELATIONS 322-23 (W. H. Rattigan trans., 1884).
513.
See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENvTL. L. 773, 773 (2002).
514.
See id. at 807 (arguing that property rights do not exist in isolation but are
"rooted in a dynamic and integrated social and ecological community that changes over
time").
515.
See supra Part IV.B.
516.
See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 457, at 102 (discussing dignity as a critical
concept in classical theories of deliberation).
517.
See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 860 (noting that law rationally embraces
that "[h]uman beings value goods, events, and relationships in diverse and plural
ways").
518.
See id.
519.
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 60 ("A city is a complex whole,
composed of individuals and families, with all the disparate, messy, often conflicting
concerns that individuals and families have, including their religious practices, their
concern for the burial of kin.").
520.
See id. at 70 ("For these people experience the complexities of the tragedy
while and by being a certain sort of community, not by having each soul go off in
isolation from its fellows.. . .").
521.
Cf. id. at 421 (discussing the conflict between richness and purity in the
ethical lives of Greeks).
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concord where they would have failed alone. 5 22 By becoming yielding,

participation crosses with property. 52 3 Yielding means to respect the
property rights of autrui participating in discourse, to acknowledge
his or her right to otherness.5 24 In other words, civic participation
becomes a property right of the participant.5 2 5
The ultimate end goal of process is not some external goal but
the permanence of process itself.52 6 Permanence of process is the
permanence of self-governance. 527 Process thus does not strive toward
something. 528 "It" is already there. 529 Process strives to maintain
itself through change-it adapts. This adaptation is not teleological in
the sense of social Darwinism. It is teleological in the sense of
Renaissance conservatism-to conserve the delicate balance of selfgovernment by civil society against the forces of fortune and thus
create the social conditions for the flourishing of its members,5 3 0
This leaves the final question of usefulness of freedom as dignity
in the transnational legal process. Can freedom as dignity help
resolve actual disputes within the transnational legal process? And
how would it do so?
Again, Ukraine provides a helpful example. Freedom as dignity
helps to make sense of the various disparate arguments presented as
part of the transnational legal process by the United States and
Russia. Freedom as dignity makes all of these various arguments
relevant to a common conception of freedom-be it one that does not
have a single common positive good other than the perpetuation of
process itself. This insight also helps to crystallize suspicions about
the Russian claims and arguments in two ways. First, Russian
conduct appears to make the arguments advanced in the

522.
Cf. Alain Pottage, A Unique and Different Subject of Law, 16 CARDoZO L.
REV. 1161, 1173 (1995) ("[A]dmiration describes the impulse of an intentionality which
encounters the world as a renewed 'advent or event of the other' [1'avenement ou
l'evenement de l'autre]." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
523.
See id.
524.
See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participationin International
Law, in LAw AND MORAL ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 77, 100 (Michael Loriaux

& Cecilia Lynch eds., 2000) (concluding that the current state of international law
clearly recognizes a right to participate in governance).
525.
Cf. Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in CulturalLife:
On Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIs. INT'L L.J. 637, 661-62 (2010) (engaging the
question of participatory rights in the context of copyrights and property rights).
526.
This of course is the goal of civic humanist constitutional theory. Cf.
POCOCK, supra note 41, at 94 ("Republics existed to mobilize the intelligence and virtue
of all citizens; their stability was dependent on their doing so and if they failed they
became governments of a few, whose intelligence and virtue were doomed to decline by
their finite and insufficient character.")
527.
See id. at 92-95.
528.
529.

See id.
See id.

530.
Cf. id. at 78-79 (discussing the wheel of fortune in the project of
Rinascimento civic humanism).
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transnational legal process more transparently pretextual.5 3 Rather
than seeking to engage the process to maintain a solution within the
transnational legal process, it appears the Russian argument simply
seeks to go around the transnational legal process and achieve its
aims by poorly concealed force of arms. 532 In fact, the position is made
to appear the more pretextual as the moment the Russian
government has achieved no realities on the ground, it tends to admit
what it previously denied: the involvement of its own military in
bringing about the changed circumstances in question.5 3
Second, the conduct on the ground supported by the Russian side
has been highly disruptive of the property, participation, and
permanence.
In Crimea,
strategic assets were immediately
expropriated. 534 Political violence repressed all forms of civic
participation.5 3 5 And no sustainable long-term solution appears on
the horizon-just geopolitical disruption.

531.

See, e.g., Walesa Says Ukraine's Maidan Gave Russia Pretext to Intervene,

RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (May 23, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-

walesa-critical-euromaidan/25395933.html [http://perma.cclXC57-J9XQ] (archived Jan.
20, 2015) (describing Lech Walesa's argument that the Maidan protesters' failure to
negotiate with Russia gave Putin a pretext for invasion).
532.
See, e.g., Roman Oleacrchyk & Kathrin Hille, Kerry Accuses Moscow of
Creating 'Pretext'for Ukraine Invasion, FIN. TIMES (U.K.) (Apr. 8, 2014, 5:11 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/Oafle45a-bee4- 1e3-8683-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3SDgeY3UZ
[http://perma.cc/S8KL-UWQL] (archived Jan. 20, 2015) (citing John Kerry's description
of Russia's actions as "an illegal and illegitimate effort to destabilise a sovereign
state").
533.
Compare Alexander Smith & Alexandra Mazikina, Vladimir Putin Admits
Russian Forces Helped Crimea Separatists, NBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014, 4:40 AM),
http://www.nbenews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/vladimir-putin-admits-russian-forceshelped-crimea-separatists-n82756 [http://perma.cc/SPX4-UAMQI (archived Jan. 20,
2015) (reporting an admission by Vladimir Putin that Russian troops had been active
in supporting Crimean separatists), with Bill Chappell & Mark Memmott, Putin Says
Those Aren't Russian Forces in Crimea, NPR (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:05 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russianforces-in-crimea [http://perma.cc/4JV8-AN7K] (archived Jan. 20, 2015).
534.
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce Bureau of Indus. & Sec.,
Commerce Department Announces Move Against Russian Expropriation of Ukrainian
Company (Apr. 11, 2014), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/
newsroom/press-releases/107-about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/press-release-2014/
660-commerce-department-announces-move-against-russian-expropriation-of-ukrainiancompany [http://perma.cc/G3XF-SUPH] (archived Jan. 20, 2015) (describing an instance
in which Russia had seized a Ukrainian gas company); Elena Popina, Cargill Says
Plant is Under Armed Occupation in Ukraine, BLOOMBERG Bus. (July 11, 2014, 4:14
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-10/cargill-suspends-ukraine-processingplant-after-armed-occupation.htnl [http://perma.cc/8AAM-F3YR] (archived Jan. 20,
2015) (reporting an instance in which an American company's plant, located in eastern
Ukraine, was occupied by a group of armed individuals).
535.
See, e.g., Hugs and Thugs, ECONOMIST (Mar. 22, 2014), available at http://
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21599407-some-crimeans-welcome-annexation-violencenot-far-surface-hugs-and-thugs [http://perma.cc/X2U2-8DFM] (archived Jan. 20, 2015)
(reporting political violence including torture in the run up to the Crimean
referendum).

540

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 48:471

By comparison, the United States' position appears relatively
more concerned with the dignity process participants. Its arguments
seem less brazenly pretextual. 53 6 Engagement of civic leaders seems
to be part of a discourse if only because no military forces have been
maneuvered into place to create new realities on the ground before
discourse would have even had a chance to mature and engage. ProRussian politicians are on the whole able to continue to work in
Ukraine and engage their colleagues. And the goal on the United
States' side is to find a diplomatically brokered permanent solution
that protects the basic participatory rights of the Ukraine people as a
whole rather than just the Western leaning portion of its electorate.
But by no means do the United States and its allies in Kyiv or
Europe act like angels. Both sides have committed politically
motivated violence. 537 Ukraine further is attempting to deprive
Crimeans of water and electricity that are an absolute necessity for
their economy to remain self-sustaining.5 3 8 These actions cannot be
condoned and do not fit within the transnational legal process. They
appear on their face in violation of basic international legal norms. 539
That being said, a dignity conception of freedom shows how the
current crisis can be addressed from a legal point of view. It shows
that the inductive, particularized method of the transnational legal
process does not ultimately transform transnational law into pure
Realpolitik in better clothing. It aims at a particularly legal goodbut one befitting of the inherent plurality of the international
community.

V. CONCLUSION: FREEDOM AS THE END OF BALANCE
Placing freedom as dignity at the core of the transnational legal
process in many ways is a happy return. Earlier process theories,
such as Myres McDougal's policy school, principally relied upon

536.
See supra Part II for a full discussion of the arguments advanced.
537.
See Sabrina Tavernise & Noah Sneider, Enmity and Civilian Toll Rises in
Ukraine while Attention is Diverted, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2014, at A9, available at
http-/www.nytimes.com/2014107/29/world/europe/civilian-death-toll-rise-in-ukraine.html?_r-0
[http://perma.cc/Z2WD-WJ2KJ (archived Jan. 20, 2015).
See lana Zagoruiko, Vote to Join Russia Could Leave Crimea Without
538.
Water, Electricity, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/
03/16/vote-to-join-russia-could-leave-crimea-dry-in-dark/
[http://perma.cc/3Y37-XPRT]
(archived Jan. 20, 2015) (outlining Ukrainian leadership's threats to Crimea in the
event that a secession referendum occurs).
539.
Cf. Michael Bothe, Cutting Off Electricity and Water for the Gaza Strip,
Limits Under International Law, Preliminary Expert Opinion, DIAKONIA (July 18,
2014), http://www.diakonia.se/globalassets/documents/ihl/ihl-resources-center/expertopinions/michael-bothe-july-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/6T7F-FGRX] (archived Jan. 20,
2015) (discussing the legality of similar measures in the Gaza strip).
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human dignity as the end goal of legal process."40 The end of dignity
was an external goal for law-a policy prescription checking and
measuring legal progress.41 In this sense, McDougal turned law into
a science-a classical technd in the Platonic sense.5 42 Consistent with
this technd, McDougal sought to anchor the external value of legal
process empirically. He engaged in comparative legal research
showing that dignity was in fact a measure or value inherent in legal
systems around the world."5 3 Thus, reliance upon dignity as an
external value was not alien to law but rather already recognized by
the participants as forming part of their legal value systems.5 4 ' By
making legal process about dignity, in other words, law would gain
greater externally measurable precision as prescriptive science
without imposing an entirely prescriptive regime.
Koh's transnational legal process started out by rejecting this
external measure for prescription. 54 5 He insisted that the process
must rely upon values internal to its participants. 546 It could not
borrow external value goals. 7 Thus, a further development of
process theory away from McDougal was needed to make process
truly self-sustaining-and truly legitimate. 548
If transnational legal process similarly is about dignity, it
appears we have come full circle. Does this mean that the
transnational legal process theory was simply wrong in abandoning
policy science?

540.
See, e.g., Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 42, at 576 (explaining
that the school is a process school seeking "a preferred future world public order of
human dignity"). For a discussion of the concept of human dignity in the New Haven
School, see, for example, 2 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 737-86

(1992) (partially specifying human dignity and providing a note on derivation).
541.
See id. ("[Tihe political elites of the globe have already committed
themselves to the goal of harmonizing world public order with the dignity of man."
(footnote omitted)).
542.
See NUSSBAUM, FOG, supra note 41, at 79 (defining techne as "a man of
art"); Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 42, at 576 (describing the way the New
Haven School adopted analytical features of other disciplines). For a detailed
discussion, see generally Hengameh Saberi, Love It or Hate It, But for the Right
Reasons: Pragmatism and the New Haven School's International Law of Human
Dignity, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (2012) (discussing the development of the
New Haven School's approach to dignity).
543.
See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 540, at 737-38; see also Adeno
Addis, The Role of Human Dignity in a World of Plural Values and Ethical
Commitments, 31 NETH. Q. Hum. R. 403 (2013) (examining various approaches to
human dignity and arguing for a new approach).
544.
See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 540, at 737-38.
545.
See Koh, TLP, supra note 14, at 183-84.
546.
See id.
547.
548.

See id.
See id.

542

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 48:471

Quite the opposite is true. The transnational legal process
demonstrates the internal necessity of dignity as the core value of
process. Rather than justifying law by reference to an external
measure, process can generate not only the norms that govern its
participants but also develop a Selbstverstdndnis of its ultimate
value. 549 Dignity is hardwired into process and not externally
imposed upon it. This means that the transnational legal process
would cease to operate without a dignity measure. In other words, it
has achieved perhaps the most difficult feat of all-it has internalized
human dignity in all of international and transnational law as a
matter of functional necessity. Or, aphoristically-"As within, so
without."5 50

Selbstverstlindnis refers to the "self-understanding," or, for purposes of
549.
migration into the English language, the self-directed equivalent of Weltanschauung,
or "world-view." See Selbstversttindnis Definition, DIcT.CC, ENGLISH-GERMAN
DICTIONARY, http://www.dict.cc/german-englishlSelbstverstC3%A4ndnis.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/FNV3-9CAA] (archived Jan. 20, 2015); Weltanschauung
Definition, DICT.cc, ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY, http://www.dict.cc/?s=Weltanschauung
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SLS9-AZDK] (archived Jan. 20, 2015).
550.
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